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PUBLISH AT YOUR OWN RISK OR DON’T PUBLISH 
AT ALL: FORUM SHOPPING TRENDS IN LIBEL 





Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld’s British publisher declined to publish 
her new book, Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and How 
to Stop It, after a wealthy Saudi, whose name appears in the book, 
threatened to sue the publisher for defamation.1 Nevertheless, Dr. 
Ehrenfeld was sued in a British court after twenty-three copies of 
her book were sold through online retailers to individuals in the 
United Kingdom (UK), and after the first chapter was posted on 
the ABC News website.2 Dr. Ehrenfeld’s book traces the money 
underwriting terrorist organizations, and it alleged that Khalid 
Salim A Bin Mahfouz, a Saudi banker, funds terrorist activity. Mr. 
Mahfouz’s lawsuit claimed that statements in the book linking him 
to Al Qaeda and other entities defamed him in England, where he 
                                                          
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2007; B.A. Georgetown University, 
2001. The author would like to thank her family and friends for their love, 
encouragement, patience and support. Special thanks extended to Professors 
Neil Cohen and Richard Winfield for their guidance during the writing process. 
She would also like to thank the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their 
assistance and insight. 
 1 Sarah Lyall, Are Saudis Using British Libel Laws to Deter Critics?, NY 
TIMES, May 22, 2004, at B1. 
2 Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (Q.B.D.) 1156 (Eng). The total 
number of unique visitors to the ABCnews.com website during the month was 
approximately 211,000, so the court inferred that a significant portion of those 
visitors would have accessed the relevant pages. Id. 
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conducts business and owns homes.3 Dr. Ehrenfeld decided not to 
challenge the suit, and Mr. Mahfouz won a default judgment 
against her.4 Dr. Ehrenfeld then sought a declaratory judgment 
from the Southern District of New York to prevent enforcement of 
the decision in the United States (US) as a violation of her rights 
under the First Amendment.5 
Dr. Ehrenfeld was not the first author to connect Mr. Mahfouz 
to terrorist organizations and thereafter face a defamation action in 
the UK.6 Mr. Mahfouz claims to have successfully sued or settled 
with over thirty other publications that have alleged that he has 
links to terrorism.7 Many of those actions have been successful 
simply because the defendants settled with Mr. Mahfouz, due to 
the high cost of libel litigation.8 Further, it is Mr. Mahfouz himself 
who faces lawsuits, in the US, for his alleged financial 
involvement and thus support of recent terrorist attacks.9 
Dr. Ehrenfeld’s case is not unique. Throughout the world, and 
often in the UK, journalists must defend themselves against libel 
laws stricter than those in their own country.10 American 
journalists relying on the protections of the First Amendment are 
finding that foreign courts willingly assert jurisdiction over them if 
the material they publish is viewed in those countries.11 
                                                          
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 04-CV-09641, 2005 WL 696769 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 
23, 2005). 
6 Lyall, supra note 1 (citing a lawsuit that Mahfouz won against The Mail 
on Sunday for similar accusations); Jeffrey Toobin, Let’s Go: Libel, THE NEW 
YORKER, Aug. 8, 2005 (describing Mahfouz’s website citing libel victories). 
7 Thomas Lipscomb, Another First Amendment Landmark Case?, EDITOR 
& PUBLISHER, Mar. 21, 2005, available at http://www.public-integrity.org/ 
publications/publications85.htm. 
8 Id. For example, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post and The 
New York Times have all settled actions with Mr. Mahfouz. Id. Further, his 
website lists several recent suits, the court decisions, and often formal apologies 
from the publishers. Bin Mahfouz Information, www.binmahfouz.info (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2005). 
9 Lipscomb, supra note 7. 
10 David Kohler, Forty Years After New York Times v. Sullivan: The 
Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, 83 OR. L. REV. 1203, 1204-05 (2004). 
11 See Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (Q.B.D.) 1156 (Eng.) 
(inferring that since a number of people in the UK viewed the ABC news 
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Disseminating information over the Internet provides courts with 
justification for extending their jurisdiction beyond traditional 
geographic boundaries.12 The actions of unrelated third parties—
readers of articles online, online book purchasers—substantiate 
jurisdiction in foreign defamation disputes.13 For publishers, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate all of the laws they may be 
subject to under such unlimited jurisdiction.14 American courts 
have previously protected authors and publishers by refusing to 
enforce foreign judgments that cannot be reconciled with the US 
Constitution.15 However, such relief is not available when the 
foreign defendant has assets in the jurisdiction where the action is 
pursued since this creates jurisdiction over the American defendant 
by the foreign state.16 
The Internet is a new medium that simply highlights recurring 
issues in international libel litigation.17 In defamation actions 
pursued abroad, the problem often lies in the conflict between the 
foreign jurisdiction’s substantive laws and the laws of the 
defendant’s home country. In the US, the First Amendment 
protects speech to promote an open exchange of ideals. In contrast, 
many foreign nations acknowledge the importance of expression, 
but are equally protective of an individual’s interest in his or her 
reputation.18 This Note examines the differences between libel 
laws of the US and the UK, as an example of the liability 
American media companies can face under foreign laws. 
                                                          
website, a significant number of those people would have accessed the alleged 
defamatory material); Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick [2002] 210 C.L.R. 575, 607 
(Austl.) (substantiating jurisdiction based on subscription access to the 
publication’s website). 
12 Brian P. Werley, Aussie Rules: Universal Jurisdiction Over Internet 
Defamation, 18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 199, 200 (2004). 
13 See Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (Q.B.D.) 1156 (Eng.) 
(substantiating jurisdiction because the book was available and purchased 
through online retailers); Dow Jones & Co., 210 C.L.R. at 607 (substantiating 
jurisdiction based on subscription access to the publication’s website). 
14 Werley, supra note 12, at 231. 
15 See, e.g., Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997). 
16 Werley, supra note 12, at 229. 
17 Dow Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 605. 
18 See discussion infra Part I. 
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Part I of this Note examines US and British libel law 
jurisprudence, and contrasts the two models through a discussion 
of a UK case involving an American media company. Part II 
compares jurisdictional controversies within the US with the 
decisions of foreign courts to exercise jurisdiction over American 
defendants. Part III returns to Dr. Ehrenfeld’s case and considers 
its potential for success based on past attempts to enforce foreign 
libel judgments in the US. Part IV analyzes the chilling effect that 
foreign libel laws could have on members of the American media 
if the trend of libel judgments in foreign courts continues or 
intensifies. This section also examines potential solutions to the 
conflicts in defamation law and proposes that the most feasible 
means of resolving the conflict lies within the status quo. 
I. LIBEL LAWS 
Throughout the world, freedom of expression is regarded as 
essential to democracy, but in practice this can mean different 
things in different places. In the US, speech is accorded the highest 
value and injury to one’s reputation is sometimes an unfortunate 
consequence of maintaining this freedom.19 Elsewhere, the value 
placed on free expression may not override a person’s interest in 
protecting their reputation. In some countries, defamation laws 
allow the courts to impose criminal sanctions on the defendant, 
thus creating a potential chill on the media.20 Australia and Canada 
have both broadened the scope of their protection of free 
expression in matters of political concern, but explicitly refuse to 
expand the rule to mirror the protection of speech afforded in the 
US.21 
                                                          
19 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964). 
20 John Di Bari, A Survey of the Internet Jurisdiction Universe, 18 N.Y. 
INT’L. L. REV. 123, 157-60 (2005) (citing examples of criminal sanctions 
imposed for defamation in Germany, Italy and Zimbabwe). See also Rachel L. 
Swarns, Government and Media Spar in Zimbabwe, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2002, 
at A3; Despite Court Order, Zimbabwe Deports American Journalist, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 17, 2003, at A5. 
21 See generally Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corp. [1997] 189 C.L.R. 
520 (Austl.) (supporting a qualified privilege pertaining to information on 
politics or government, as long as reporting is reasonable and not done with 
MALY MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:36 PM 
 FORUM SHOPPING IN LIBEL LAW LITIGATION 887 
While each European country operates under its own laws, the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is influential in 
the interpretation and development of these laws. The ECHR was 
drawn up by Western European nations in response to the 
perceived threat that communism in Eastern Europe could become 
to human rights, and this treaty created the European Court of 
Human Rights to ensure observance of the articles of the 
Convention.22 The ECHR advocates the right to freedom of 
expression as one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society, but allows exceptions to this freedom, including for the 
protection of reputation.23 The exceptions must be balanced against 
                                                          
malice); Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.) 
(specifically refusing to adopt the New York Times standards of US law). See 
also Leonard Leigh, Of Free Speech and Individual Reputation: New York 
Times v. Sullivan in Canada and Australia, in IMPORTING THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 49 (Ian Loveland ed., 1998); Kyo Ho Youm, Impact of Freedom 
of the Press Abroad, 22 Fall COMM. LAW. 12 (overview of countries that have 
expanded their law regarding freedom of expression). 
22 GEOFFREY ROBERTSON & ANDREW NICOL, MEDIA LAW, 35 (4th ed. 
2002). The ECHR set forth a catalogue of civil and political rights and freedoms 
and eventually established the European Court of Human Rights as a mechanism 
of enforcement of the obligations of the signatory states. All judgments are only 
binding on the Member States concerned. See European Court of Human Rights, 
Historical Background and Judgments, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Mar. 
5, 2006). The UK was the first signatory in 1953, and the ECHR has since been 
ratified by all 41 Member States of the Council of Europe. It did not become law 
in the UK until its provisions were adopted by Parliament, which was done 
through the Human Rights Act of 1998, which came into force in October of 
2000. 
23 Article 10 of the European Council on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms provides: 
1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authorities and regardless of 
frontiers . . . 
2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
MALY MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:36 PM 
888 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
the freedom of expression, but this balancing test is by no means 
equally weighted, in that the exceptions are interpreted strictly and 
narrowly.24 For example, restrictions that require journalists to 
prove the truth of the allegedly defamatory statements will often be 
held unnecessarily prohibitive of speech.25 European Court of 
Human Rights decisions are only binding on the signatory 
countries involved in a particular case, but the decisions influence 
the laws in the signatory countries to the ECHR, including the UK.  
British Judges do pay heed to the freedom of expression principle 
as defined by the ECHR and interpreted by the Court.26 
British and American jurisprudence values the freedom of 
expression, but the two countries differ as to how essential the 
freedom of speech is in relation to other interests, such as 
reputation, in order to protect the freedom of expression. American 
                                                          
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality 
of the judiciary. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
24 ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22, at 38. The state bears the burden of 
proving that the restriction at issue is necessary in a democratic society and that 
there is a pressing social need for the restriction. Id. 
25 Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407, 419 (1986). Plaintiff was the 
publisher of an Austrian magazine that printed two articles accusing the 
Chancellor of protecting former members of the Nazi party for political reasons. 
Plaintiff was required to prove the truth to escape conviction under Austrian 
law, and was ultimately convicted of criminal defamation. He brought this 
action for a violation of his rights under Article 10. Id. at 408-16. The court held 
that the requirement that Lingens prove the truth of the allegations was 
impossible and infringed the freedom of opinion, which is a fundamental right 
under Article 10. Id. at 420-21. Though this case specifically deals with 
statements of opinion, it does indicate the importance placed on the freedom of 
expression, specifically when weighed against protection of reputation. Further, 
the case focused on political speech, which receives more protection than 
individual reputation. See also Oberschlick v. Austria, 19 EHRR 389 (1991). 
Oberschlick was an Austrian journalist who claimed that some of the statements 
made in a speech by politician and candidate Walter Grabher-Meyer resembled 
the beliefs of the NSDAP (the equivalent of the Nazi party). He attempted to 
have Grabher-Meyer prosecuted, and after this was unsuccessful, published the 
full criminal information. Grabher-Meyer successfully brought a defamation 
suit, and Oberschlick appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. In 
overturning his conviction, the court held that freedom of political debate is the 
core of the concept of a democratic society. 
26 ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22, at xii. 
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courts uphold the First Amendment and focus on the value of free 
expression in society.27 In consequence, the libel jurisprudence 
protects speech more so than individual reputations.28 British law 
has been slow to extend the freedom of expression to matters 
beyond political speech, and remains highly protective of 
individual reputation.29 The British libel law imposes much more 
stringent requirements on media defendants than comparable US 
law, and many identical cases would likely be decided differently 
in each country.30 The differences between British and American 
law are significant in application and contribute directly to the 
uncertainty in the American media about which defamation laws 
control and where they might be brought to defend suit.31 
A. United States Libel Laws and the First Amendment 
The First Amendment garners a near sacred place in American 
society.32 It “forbids Congress from making any law which 
abridges the freedom of speech.”33 This constitutional safeguard 
“was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.”34 Free speech is respected as a necessity to democratic 
self-government and is prized for its protection of the free 
exchange of ideas.35 As a result of the First Amendment’s role in 
society, speech and interests of open dialogue are accorded more 
                                                          
27 See infra Part I.A.1. 
28 See infra Part I.A.2. 
29 See infra Part I.B.1. 
30 David Hooper, Sullivan v. Reynolds: How Does the Actual Malice 
Principle in Sullivan Compare with the Responsible Journalism Test in 
Reynolds?, 2005 Issue No. 3 MEDIA L. RESOURCE CENTER BULL. 103, 103 
(2005). 
31 See infra Part I.B.2. 
32 Stephen Sedley, The First Amendment: A Case for Import Controls?, in 
IMPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 23, 23 (Ian Loveland ed., 1998). 
33 U.S. CONST. Amend. I 
34 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
35 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927). 
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weight than injury to reputation.36 Consequently, allegedly 
defamatory speech involving public officials, public figures and 
matters of public concern are protected by a high burden of proof 
to establish libel.37 
1. Philosophy Behind the First Amendment 
The First Amendment was adopted with no debate, and many 
of the Framers themselves were unsure what it would mean in 
practice.38 Through scholarship and jurisprudence, various theories 
have been enunciated and defended. Justice Hugo Black, for 
example, proposed the idea that the First Amendment is absolute 
and prohibits any restraint on speech.39 Alexander Meiklejohn 
promoted the notion that free speech is a necessity for self-
government.40 Justice Holmes defined the search for truth, or 
marketplace of ideas theory.41 Other theories contend that free 
speech promotes self-fulfillment and autonomy,42 or that it serves 
as a safety valve maintaining a balance between stability and 
change.43 There is no generally accepted view on what free speech 
is and what it protects, and in many ways First Amendment 
jurisprudence could be the result of the political and social climate 
at the time an issue comes before the court.44 For this reason, it is 
                                                          
36 See generally New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Curtis 
Publ’g v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 
475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
37 Id. 
38 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM 
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 42 (2004). 
39 Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 864, 874 (1960). 
40 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 24-27 (1948). 
41 Abrahams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, 
dissenting). 
42 David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral 
Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974). 
43 THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 11-15 (1966). 
44 STONE supra note 38, at 4-5 (suggesting that the only time the 
government has sought to punish speech and criticism is when the country is 
involved in war). 
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necessary to look at the two primary theories—specifically the 
democratic self-government notion and the marketplace of ideas 
theory—to understand its current role. 
One theory of the First Amendment contends that it is a 
necessary element of self-government: For people to govern 
themselves they must be free to pass their own judgment.45 
Philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn felt this principle could be 
deduced “from the basic American agreement that public issues 
shall be decided by universal suffrage.”46 In his concurring opinion 
in Whitney v. California, Justice Brandeis set forth the history of 
the First Amendment and its intended value for self-government. 
Those who won our independence believed that the final 
end of the state was to make men free to develop their 
facilities, and that in its government the deliberative forces 
should prevail over the arbitrary . . . . They believed that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are 
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth . . . . Believing in the power of reason as 
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence 
coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form. 
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing 
majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free 
speech and assembly should be guaranteed.47 
Justice Brandeis’ democratic self-government paradigm 
suggests that speech is not the end goal but rather a means to a 
free-society. This view is concerned with the protection of those 
more personal actions, such as thought and communication, that 
allow individuals to participate in the public act of governing.48 
This freedom extends beyond politics to all means by which 
individuals obtain knowledge, including education and public 
discussion of issues.49 Further, within the democratic self-
government theory of the First Amendment, there is also the theory 
                                                          
45 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 40, at 26. 
46 Id. 
47 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927). 
48 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. 
CT. REV. 245, 255 (1961). 
49 Id. at 256-57. 
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that identifies self-government, not through individual decision 
making as Meiklejohn suggests, but in the process in which 
citizens identify the government as their own.50 Official limitations 
on public discourse would imply the democratic illegitimacy of the 
state because any such results would only be achieved by limiting 
the citizens’ ability to participate in the democratic process.51 
On the other hand, freedom of expression can also be seen as 
an end in itself. In his marketplace-of-ideas theory, Justice Holmes 
suggests that more benefit is gained by society through free 
expression.52 He stated that the “best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.”53 Judge Learned Hand expressed a similar sentiment 
about the First Amendment: “It presupposes that right conclusions 
are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than 
through any kind of authoritative selection.”54 The more people air 
competing opinions and explain the values of their views, the more 
likely people in society will understand the options and make the 
best choices in all contexts. Free speech is justified based on the 
overall benefits to society, and not due to the particular benefits 
that the individual speaker may receive.55 These views require 
tolerance of all speech, and Justice Holmes required a showing of 
“clear and present danger” to stifle speech.56 This model does 
endorse a function conducive to self-government because the 
marketplace of ideas allows people to make informed voting 
choices based on a plethora of all relevant information. But, it 
suggests that free speech exists for the primary purpose of truth 
                                                          
50 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2367-68 (2000). 
51 Id. 
52 Abrahams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, 
dissenting). 
53 Id. See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes, 
dissenting). 
54 United Statea v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
55 Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 
DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1984). 
56 Abrahams, 250 U.S. at 630-31. 
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and not good government.57 
2. Libel Law Jurisprudence 
These competing theories of the First Amendment affect its 
interpretation and application in the courts. Though the language of 
the First Amendment could imply otherwise, the rights protected 
are by no means absolute.58 The tort of defamation imposes 
restrictions on what can be spoken and printed.59 The Supreme 
Court has alternated between the paradigms of self-government 
and “the marketplace of ideas” in its decisions, depending on the 
interest to be protected.60 New York Times v. Sullivan,61 and its 
progeny, established the Constitutional standard to be applied in 
libel and defamation cases. 
In New York Times, the Respondent Sullivan was an elected 
official who supervised the police department in Montgomery 
County, Alabama. He claimed that an advertisement printed in The 
New York Times contained defamatory statements pertaining to 
police activity against students during civil rights demonstrations.62 
Though he was not named specifically in the ad, the reference to 
the police, he argued, implicated him as the Commissioner of 
Public Affairs.63 It was not disputed that some of the statements in 
the ad were not accurate depictions of the events described.64 
                                                          
57 Ronald J. Krotosyzynski, Jr., The Chrysanthemum, The Sword and the 
First Amendment: Disentangling Culture, Community and Freedom of 
Expression, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 905, 919 (1998). 
58 Koningsberg v. California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961). 
59 50 AM. JUR. 2d Libel and Slander § 118. Defamation is a false 
publication that causes injury to a person’s reputation, or exposing him to 
contempt, public hatred, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or which affects him 
adversely in his trade or business. Id. at § 6.  “Libel consists of the publication 
of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical 
form or by any other form of communication that has the potentially harmful 
qualities characteristic of written or printed words.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 568 (1977). 
60 Krotosyzynski, supra note 57, at 923. 
61 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
62 Id. at 256. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 258. 
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The Court in New York Times was more concerned with the 
nature of the speech sought to be protected, rather than which 
litigant should prevail.65 As the Court suggested, this approach 
recognizes the value of speech in the larger public context.66 First, 
the decision brought libel under the standards of the First 
Amendment, proclaiming, “libel can claim no talismanic immunity 
from constitutional limitations.”67 After discussing the importance 
of freedom of speech, the court concluded that injury to the 
reputation of public officials is not a sufficient justification for 
silencing speech.68 The potential harm from silencing speech is not 
saved by an “exception for a test of truth.”69 To safeguard against 
self-censorship by the media and constraints on public discourse 
about public officials, the Court held that to recover for libel a 
plaintiff must prove that a “statement was made with ‘actual 
malice’that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard for whether it was false or not.”70 
This presents a difficult barrier for plaintiffs to overcome in 
bringing defamation actions. The court balanced the constitutional 
implications of the different forms of speech—specifically if and 
what kind of defamatory speech is considered protected speech 
under the First Amendment—rather than balancing the interests of 
the individual parties.71 This distinction reflects the importance 
placed on public dialogue, as a free society should be able to 
contemplate matters of public concern, including the conduct of 
public officials.72 Public officials who feel they have been wronged 
by erroneous speech are encouraged to respond with speech, rather 
than to seek repression of the allegedly erroneous speech or to seek 
damages.73 
                                                          
65 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First 
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 
935, 942 (1968). 
66 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 273. 
69 Id. at 271. 
70 Id. at 279-80. 
71 Nimmer, supra note 65, at 942. 
72 Id. at 950. 
73 Id. 
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New York Times was a narrow decision limited to a libel action 
pursued by a public official, and the Court made no attempt to 
determine who would qualify as a public official.74 The plaintiff 
was an elected official, and this was sufficient.75 Speech served by 
the First Amendment, however, is not limited to the subject of 
public officers. In Curtis Publishing v. Butts and Association Press 
v. Walker,76 the New York Times rule was expanded to cover public 
figures who were not government officials. The scope of 
constitutionality for speech on public figures was determined not 
by newsworthiness but by an analogy to public officials.77 In 
Curtis Publishing, the Court held that the Founders did not intend 
to limit freedom of discussion to discussion of government, 
because a free press promotes truth in general.78 Individuals who 
garner a certain amount of public interest could be labeled public 
figures, and they tend to have access to the media to rebut 
defamatory accusations.79 This analysis focuses on the ability to 
respond to accusations and the assumption of risk in the public role 
rather than principles of promoting individual participation in self-
government. As discussed in New York Times, some plaintiffs will 
be unable to overcome the barriers of this standard, but it avoids 
the evil of self-censorship that could occur when a when a speaker 
must prove the truth of a statement to succeed in his or her 
defense.80 Rather than allow separate state libel laws for public 
figures, the Supreme Court enacted a more rigorous federal 
standard.81 
                                                          
74 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 284. 
75 In a later case, the Court described public officials as “those among the 
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, 
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs.” 
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
76 388 U.S. 130 (1967). (Plurality opinion) (cases decided together). 
77 Harry Kalvern, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, 
Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 287 (1967). 
78 Curtis Publ’g, 388 U.S. at 147. 
79 Id. at 154-55. 
80 376 U.S. at 279. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974). 
81 Curtis Publ’g, 388 U.S. at 155. Since this was a plurality opinion, there 
was not an agreed upon standard to judge libel actions for public figures. The 
Court did agree that public figures should be treated like public officials. Id. at 
162. 
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In actions involving private figures, the justifications used in 
New York Times and Curtis Publishing are not as readily 
applicable. Private figures do not thrust themselves into the 
spotlight as do public officials or figures, and private figures do not 
have effective opportunities for rebuttal available to them.82 The 
need to protect an individual’s reputation becomes more crucial in 
these situations in which unwanted public exposure leaves 
individuals more vulnerable to injury.83 In Gertz v. Welch, the 
Court declined to apply the New York Times standard to private 
figures, and deferred to state law, as states had an interest in 
compensating private individuals for injury to reputation.84 Gertz 
does require that a plaintiff show fault to recover damages.85 
In Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,86 the Court also 
recognized a heightened protection of speech as to matters of 
public concern involving private figures, though it affirmed that 
this standard is less forbidding than when the plaintiff is a public 
figure involved in a matter of public concern.87 In these instances, 
since the public could benefit from the dissemination of 
information, the balance favors protecting speech.88 The Court held 
that “where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, the 
Plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the 
                                                          
82 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45. The Petitioner was a reputable attorney who 
agreed to represent a Chicago police officer accused of murder. An article in 
Respondent’s paper called him a ‘Communist-fronter,’ claimed he had a 
criminal record and also accused him of arranging a ‘frame-up’ of his client. Id. 
at 325-26. Petitioner Gertz was not a public figure in that he had achieved no 
general fame and he “did not thrust himself into the vortex of the public issue.” 
Id. at 351-52. 
83 Id. at 345. 
84 Id. at 345-47. 
85 Id. at 347. The Court also recognized the danger of self-censorship 
resulting from punitive damages. As a result, a private defamation plaintiff who 
wants to recover punitive damages must meet the high actual malice standards 
of New York Times; otherwise, the individual will be limited in recovery to 
actual damage sustained. Id. at 350. 
86 475 U.S. 767 (1986). Hepps was the principle stockholder of a 
corporation that franchised a chain of convenience stores. A series of articles 
was published linking him and the corporation to organized crime. He then 
brought the defamation suit. Id. at 768-70. 
87 Id. at 776. 
88 Id. at 776-77. 
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statements at issue are also false.”89 The plaintiff must show fault 
on the part of the publisher regarding the adequacy of the 
investigation to recover damages, and to an extent this will include 
evidence of the falsity of the allegations.90 This standard imposes 
less of a burden on plaintiffs than the requirement of showing 
“actual malice” or “knowledge of falsity” as in the New York 
Times standards. It does not have the same deterrent effect on the 
media, because the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the falsity of 
the allegedly defamatory statement.91 The Court decided that the 
balance should favor protecting true speech.92 Some false speech 
may be allowed to stand because the plaintiff cannot meet the 
burden, but the Court judged that this is preferable to have true 
speech deterred.93 Placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff, 
rather than the publisher, makes it much less likely that speech of 
public concern will be deterred.94 
These cases overwhelmingly favor the interests of speech over 
reputation. In summary, in defamation actions, the court considers 
both the plaintiff’s role in society and the nature of the information 
at issue. Starting with New York Times, public figures bringing 
defamation actions must show that the alleged defamatory 
statement was made with actual malice—that is, with knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether or not it was 
false.95 This standard has been extended to public figures, but the 
Court does not require as exacting a standard for speech involving 
private figures. 
The various US approaches favor speech, and in contrast, UK 
law shows more deference to the presumed injury to individual 
reputation. The balance between the freedom of expression and 
individual reputation shifts differently, such that free speech 
interests are not perceived as being a sufficient justification to 
protect potentially false speech. 
                                                          
89 Id. at 769. 
90 Id. at 778. 
91 Id. at 777. 
92 Id. at 793. 
93 Id. at 776. 
94 Id. at 777. 
95 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
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B. United Kingdom Libel Laws 
The freedom of expression does not have the same 
constitutional origins or statutory protections in Great Britain that 
it has in the US, but it does nonetheless constitute a respected 
value in British law.96 No definitive statement exists in the 
statutory law to define the scope of free speech; rather the freedom 
exists where neither common law nor statute restricts it.97 The 
courts acknowledge in their opinions the importance of protecting 
the freedom of expression and its importance in the political 
process.98 British judges, however, are not swayed by lengthy 
arguments of the underlying political or moral philosophy behind 
freedom of speech and expression, nor is it usual for them to 
discuss these principles in their opinions.99 While freedom of 
expression and the dissemination of information are important in 
the context of libel, reputation is still accorded significant 
importance, except in matters of political speech. There are limited 
exceptions to the strict libel law standards for free speech 
concerns.100 
1. Libel Law Jurisprudence 
The British defamation laws predominantly treat all plaintiffs 
the same, regardless of whether they are public or private 
figures.101 In libel cases in Great Britain, the court presumes that a 
                                                          
96  ERIC BARENDT ET AL., LIBEL AND THE MEDIA: THE CHILLING EFFECT 1 
(1997). 
97 Id. at 29. Article 10 of the ECHR was incorporated into British Law. 
Though it does create a statutory right of freedom of expression, the limits are 
not defined. ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22. 
98 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers [2001] 2.A.C. 127, 200 (U.K.). See, e.g., 
Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers, Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534 
(refusing a common law right of government institutions to bring an action for 
defamation damages as contrary to public policy for prohibiting speech). 
99 Barendt, supra note 96, at 30. This stands in contrast to their American 
counterparts whose speech related opinions often consist of thorough 
discussions of the underlying principles. 
100 Id. at 178. 
101 Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation §1.9 (2d. ed. 1999). 
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contested statement is defamatory.102 The defendant typically has 
the burden to prove the truth of the allegedly defamatory statement 
to defeat the charges.103 This has changed little from common law 
origins and remains a great challenge for the defendant.104 In 2002, 
the British government adopted the Human Rights Act of 1998 that 
guarantees a freedom of expression in accordance with Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.105 This covenant 
reflects the ideal that freedom of speech is itself an aim and a 
cornerstone of democratic society.106 Though there is now a 
statutory recognition of freedom of expression, the judiciary is still 
extremely protective of individual reputations.107 
In a defamation action, the plaintiff needs to show that the 
work identified him or her, conveyed a defamatory meaning, and 
was published by the defendant or in circumstances in which the 
defendant controlled the publication.108 A statement is generally 
understood as defamatory if it is calculated to injure the reputation 
of an individual in the eyes of the reasonable members of the 
public.109 This standard does allow some room for leeway 
depending on the context of the statement. Whether a statement is 
defamatory will be measured by its ordinary meaning or the 
innuendo it coveys.110 The ordinary meaning prong is a factual 
question based on how the words would be understood by ordinary 




105 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 
(modified Nov. 1, 1998). 
106 ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22 at x. 
107 Id. Article 10(2) does allow signatory countries to limit the freedom of 
expression to protect reputation. The European Court of Human Rights has 
adopted a balancing approach when looking at the right to freedom of 
expression compared with the exception for the enumerated protections, 
including the protection of reputation. The permissible restriction must be 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ to further the stated goals. This creates a 
presumption of freedom of expression when balancing the competing interests. 
BRANDT, supra note at 96. 
108 SIR BRIAN NEILL & RICHARD RAMPTON, DUNCAN AND NEIL ON 
DEFAMATION §5.01 (2nd ed. 1983). 
109 BARENDT, supra note 96. 
110 NEILL & RAMPTON, supra note 108, at § 4.02 
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people using their general knowledge and common sense.111 
Innuendos are interpreted in context and based on any relevant 
extrinsic circumstances.112 
Since the allegedly defamatory statements are presumed false 
and actionable, the defendant must prove the truth of the 
statements or establish another privilege to defeat the charges.113 In 
addition to challenging any of the previously named elements of a 
prima facie case,114 the defendant can either claim a justification or 
a privilege. Under the justification defense, the defendant bears the 
burden of proving the truth of the words in substance or in fact.115 
This burden presents a difficult barrier for defendants to overcome 
when faced with a libel suit.116 For example, David Irving, a 
leading figure in the Holocaust denial, accused Deborah Lipstadt 
of defaming him in her book Denying the Holocaust—The 
Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. In defense, Lipstadt was 
required to prove that the Holocaust happened to defeat the 
claim.117 By the time she succeeded, she had run up a considerably 
                                                          
111 Id. at § 4.04 
112 Id. at § 4.18 
113 BARENDT, supra note 96, at 9. 
114 The work identified him or her, conveyed a defamatory meaning, and 
was published by the defendant or in circumstances in which the defendant 
controlled the publication. Supra note 100. 
115 NEILL & RAMPTON, supra note 108, at §§ 11.01 and 11.03. It should be 
noted that the defendant’s state of mind in publishing the work is irrelevant. 
116 The procedures and costs of proving the truth of a defense can be 
significant. Media defendants may not be able to produce witnesses that they 
relied on and promised confidentiality to. Claimants may plead in the most 
exaggerated sense of the meaning of the alleged defamatory statement, and so 
the media defendant must prove the truth in this meaning and other perceived 
innuendo. The costs of the process can be significant. The discovery process and 
ability to cross-examine the libel plaintiff, who almost always must take the 
stand, do lessen the difficulties slightly. ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22, at 
114-17. 
117 Irving v. Penguin Books, [2001] EWCA Civ 1197. Irving is a published 
historian. In her book, Lipstadt identifies Irving as a denier of the Holocaust 
who skews data to reach unreliable conclusions. In the course of the trial, 
Lipstadt brought forth numerous expert witnesses discrediting his theories, 
among them that gas chambers were an impossibility. The entire legal battle 
lasted approximately five years. Deborah Lipstadt, Irving v. Penguin UK and 
Deborah Lipstadt: Building a Defense Strategy, an Essay, 27 NOVA L. REV. 243 
(Winter 2002). In an interesting follow-up, David Irving was arrested in Austria 
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high legal bill.118 
British law has exceptions that can save defendants from 
overcoming the burden of proving the truth of the underlying 
statement at issue. The courts do acknowledge that there may be 
higher priorities in the wider public interest.119 The “fair comment” 
exception may apply to opinions made by the author on a matter of 
public interest.120 The statement must also be based on fact, 
reasonably seen as an opinion that the author could express based 
on those facts, and made without malice.121 The legal rules for this 
defense can be very technical and juries still often look at whether 
the truth of the underlying allegation has been proven.122 
Another exception to the British libel laws is an absolute 
privilege exception that mainly applies to comments made by 
members of Parliament, but members of the press can claim this 
defense for fair and accurate reporting on judicial proceedings.123 
The libel laws further recognize a qualified privilege when 
reporting on a government entity, reasoning that due to the public 
interest, government bodies should be open to criticism and these 
institutions should be unable to prohibit speech.124 The qualified 
privilege exception assumes that a legal, moral or social duty exists 
from the publisher communicating the information to the reader 
receiving it.125 This privilege, however, is rather vague and the 
                                                          
on November 11, 2005 and charged with Holocaust denial. The charges 
specifically stem from statements he made in two speeches in 1989 alleging that 
the Nazi gas chambers did not exist. Richard Bernstein, Austria Refuses Bail to 
Briton Accused of Denying Holocaust, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2005, at A3. He 
has since pled guilty and been sentenced to three years in prison by an Austrian 
court. AP, Austria Imposes 3-Year Sentence on Notorious Holocaust Denier, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A. 
118 Sarah Lyall, Where Suing for Libel is a National Specialty, NY TIMES, 
July 22, 2000, at B9. Her legal costs are reported to exceed three million dollars. 
119 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers [2001] 2.A.C. 127 (U.K.). (Nicholls) 
120 NEILL & RAMPTON, supra note 108, at § 12.01. 
121 Id. at § 12.02. 
122 Russell L. Weaver et al, Defamation Law and Free Speech: Reynolds v. 
Times Newspapers and the English Media, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1255, 
1269 (2004). 
123 Barendt et al., supra note 96 at 13. 
124 Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers [1993] A.C. 534 
(U.K.). 
125 NEILL & RAMPTON, supra note 108, at § 14.01 and § 14.04. 
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circumstances of each case determine its application.126 
Reynolds v. Times Newspaper127 is the leading UK case on 
qualified privilege, though it leaves the news media uncertain as to 
how much protection and what type of protection it actually 
provides upon subsequent interpretation.128 Regardless of this 
uncertainty, the case represents an expansion of defamation law 
beyond the previous narrow parameters.129 Plaintiff Albert 
Reynolds, the  former Irish Prime Minister, brought the suit for 
defamation against the British mainland edition of a national 
newspaper. The publication related to a political crisis in Ireland 
resulting in the plaintiff’s resignation as prime minister.130 He 
claimed that the words in the article injured his reputation by 
implying that he deliberately and dishonestly misled the House of 
Representatives and his cabinet colleagues.131 The trial jury 
awarded Reynolds no damages, but the court refused to recognize 
the defense of qualified privilege thus burdening the defendant 
with the costs.132 Both parties appealed the decision, and the Court 
of Appeals set the verdict aside due to jury misdirection and ruled 
that the publication was not covered by the qualified privilege.133 
The decision was appealed to the House of Lords to determine the 
issue of qualified privilege.134 
In Reynolds, the court refused to adopt a new qualified 
privilege encompassing all political speech, as the defendants 
proposed, because it would fail to provide adequate protection for 
reputation.135 The court also thought it unsound to distinguish 
between political matters and other matters of public concern.136 
                                                          
126 Id. at § 14.03. 
127 [2001] 2.A.C. 127 (U.K.). 
128 Weaver, supra note 122, at 1260-61. 
129 Ian Cram, Reading Uncertainty in Libel Law After Reynolds v. Times 
Newspapers? Jameel and the Unfolding Defense of Qualified Privilege, ENT. L. 
R. 2004, 15(5), 147-150. 
130 [2001] 2.A.C. 127, 191 (U.K.). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 192. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Reynolds, 2.A.C. at 204. 
136 Id. 
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The court decided that the qualified privilege should be available 
upon the established test of whether there has been a duty to 
publish the material to the intended recipients and whether they 
had an interest in receiving it, taking into account all of the 
circumstances of the publication.137 
The leading opinion by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead 
acknowledges and praises the importance of the freedom of 
expression.138 He sees the freedom to disseminate and receive 
information as essential to the political process.139 In looking at 
this right in light of the common law’s strict protection of 
reputation, he considers the laws of other countries, including the 
malice standard of New York Times, and declines to adopt this 
standard due to the potential implications of such a decision.140 
Ultimately, he sees the qualified privilege test as elastic and lists a 
non-inclusive list of ten factors that should be weighed.141 These 
                                                          
137 Id. at 205. Though the court adopted a qualified privilege, it ultimately 
dismissed the appeal. This was not a publication which was should in the public 
interest be protected as privilege absent proof of malice. Id. at 206. 
138 Id. at 200. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 198-201. “Malice is notoriously difficult to prove.” It would 
encourage people to publish quickly absent sufficient proof in the interest of 
getting the scoop. Id. at 201. 
141 Id. at 204-05. The factors that he names are: 1. The seriousness of the 
allegation. The more serious the charge, the more the public is misinformed and 
the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true. 2. The nature of the 
information, and the extent to which the subject matter is a matter of public 
concern. 3. The source of the information. Some informants have no direct 
knowledge of the events. Some have their own axes to grind, or are being paid 
for their stories. 4. The steps taken to verify the information. 5. The status of the 
information. The allegation may have already been the subject of an 
investigation that commands respect. 6. The urgency of the matter. News is 
often a perishable commodity. 7. Whether comment was sought from the 
plaintiff. He may have information others do not possess or have not disclosed. 
Approaching the plaintiff will not always be necessary. 8. Whether the article 
contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story. 9. The tone of the article. A 
newspaper can raise queries or call for an investigation. It need not adopt 
allegations as statements of fact. 10. The circumstances of the publication, 
including the timing. Id. at 205. 
Whether or not the matter is a qualified privilege is a matter for the judge. Lord 
Nicholls feels that the uncertainty will be resolved over time as a body of case 
law develops. Id. 
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factors cover such concerns as the quality of the newsgathering, 
the nature of the information and the importance of the 
information.142 But, he concludes, with matters of public concern, 
the court should give the freedom of expression particular 
importance in this balance, and any doubts should be resolved in 
favor of publication.143 
The opinion suggests that in matters of public concern the press 
will receive more protection against defamation actions in the 
future since doubts should favor the press, but it does not 
necessarily cause a considerable change in how the courts 
approach freedom of expression issues.144 The judgment still 
leaves wide latitude for courts to adopt their own interpretations of 
the circumstances upon considering the nature of the information 
or the tone of the piece, and thus members of the media may be 
uncertain as to how the rule will be applied.145 Further, earlier in 
the decision Reynolds affirms that considerable importance is still 
placed on protecting reputation.146 In application, the criteria in 
Reynolds are subject to rather high standards that may be difficult 
to overcome.147 This privilege requires more than subject matter 
that is of public interest.148 
On its face, the opinion could arguably resemble the Gertz and 
Philadelphia Newspapers decisions, in that it seems to offer more 
                                                          
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 205. 
144 Ian Loveland, A New Legal Landscape? Libel Law and Freedom of 
Political Expression in the United Kingdom, EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 2000, 5, 
476-92. 
145 Weaver, supra note 122, at 1315. 
146 Reynolds, 2.A.C. at 201. 
147 See generally Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe [2004] E.M.L.R. 11, 
209. The Wall Street Journal published an article describing a U.S. and Saudi 
government investigation into terrorism funding. The Jameel Group was named 
as a possible subject of the investigation. In looking at whether the subject 
matter is of public interest or concern, the court considered the urgency of the 
dissemination as relevant. While terrorism may be of general public interest, 
there was no public interest in publishing the specific names of an ongoing 
investigation in the United States at that point in time or without further 
confirmation. Id. So, the qualified privilege defense was rejected.  It has been 
suggested that this case reads the qualified privilege too narrowly. See Cram, 
supra note 129. 
148 McCartan Turkington Breen v. Times Newspapers [2001] 2 A.C. 277. 
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protection to the press in publications on matters of public concern 
that it previously did. In practice, certain journalistic decisions 
could ruin the defense149 or matters of public concern could be 
interpreted too narrowly.150 Further, public concern exceptions 
could, in the extreme, be limited to political matters, as the court is 
willing to show more tolerance in this arena.151 Ultimately, the 
standard in Reynolds implies that the defense of qualified privilege 
will be judged on whether the work at issue was published in line 
with standards of responsible journalism and whether the subject 
matter of the publication is of such a nature that it is in the public’s 
interest for it to be published.152 
2. An Example of the Plaintiff-Friendly Libel Laws Attracting 
“Libel Tourists” 
 
The United Kingdom has notoriously plaintiff-friendly laws for 
defamation that attract “libel tourists” who try to take advantage of 
the pro-plaintiff laws.153 For example, film director Roman 
Polanski recently succeeded in a libel suit in the UK against 
American magazine Vanity Fair, for defamatory statements 
contained in the magazine.154 Polanski is a resident and citizen of 
France, and a fugitive from justice in the United States.155 At trial 
he had to testify via video because his fears of extradition 
prevented him from entering the UK, his chosen venue.156 He won 
                                                          
149 Arguably, there is always something more that a journalist could have 
done in investigating a story. A publisher’s success under Reynolds could 
depend on the ability to convince a judge that it was the right editorial decision 
to publish when it did. Meryl Evans, The Reynolds Privilege in Practice, 2003 
Issue No. 3 MEDIA L. RESOURCE CENTER BULL. 23, 33 (2003). 
150 See supra note 122. 
151 Evans, supra note 149. 
152 Jameel v. Wall Street [2005] H.R.L.R 10, 387. 
153 Toobin, supra note 6. 
154 Polanski v. Conde Nast Publications, UKHL 10 (2005). 
155 Id. at ¶3, 7. 
156 The reason that he could not appear in Great Britain was fear of 
extradition to the United States where he plead guilty to the charge of unlawful 
sexual intercourse with a minor after being indicted on 6 related charges. 
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a verdict of £50,000.157 The lawsuit arose from an article in which 
Vanity Fair recounted a story of the sexual advances Polanski 
allegedly made toward a woman just after the death of his wife.158 
It is generally agreed that the story is true, but that the date of the 
incident was incorrectly reported.159 He further contests some 
statements he allegedly made that appeared in the article and 
portray him as insensitive in the wake of his wife’s murder.160 
Polanski had no real ties to the UK, and Vanity Fair’s 
circulation there was minimal compared with its larger American 
audience.161 If Polanski’s predominant concern was vindicating his 
reputation, the action would have more of an impact in the US 
where the article was more widely read, or in France where 
Polanski lived. But, since the UK is the “libel capital of the 
Western world,” it provided the more plaintiff-friendly forum.162 In 
the US, Polanski would be considered a public figure, and, thus, 
subject to the more press protective principles first defined in New 
York Times and extended in Curtis Publishing.163 Under British 
law, the qualified privilege would not apply since this is not a 
matter of public concern, and so Vanity Fair had to establish truth 
to defeat the suit. This case demonstrates how the British libel laws 
are used to circumvent the stricter American laws. 
II. JURISDICTION 
The Internet has created a world without jurisdictional 
                                                          
Graydon Carter, Roman Holiday, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2005, at 80, 92, available 
at http://www.vanityfair.com/commentary/content/articles/ 050919roco02. 
157 Id. 
158 Polanski, UKHL 10 at ¶ 3. Members of the Charles Manson cult 
murdered Polanski’s wife Sharon Tate. The article claimed that he told the 
woman he would “make another Sharon Tate out of [her]” Id. 
159 Simon Freeman, Polanski’s £ 50,000 Libel Victory, TIMES ONLINE, July 
22, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-21704484-2,00.html. 
160 Polanski, UKHL 10 at ¶5. 
161 Polanski v. Conde Nast Publications UKHL 10 ¶12 (2005). The 
circulation in England and Wales at the time was 53,000 compared to 1.13 
million in the United States. Id. 
162 Be Reasonable, TIMES ONLINE, May 19, 2005, http://www. 
timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/o,,1-41-1618105-41,00.html. 
163 See supra Part I.A.2 for a complete discussion of these tests. 
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boundaries and expanded the potential for forum shopping.164 An 
article posted on the Internet can be viewed in any country with 
telephone or cable access.165 This raises the question as to whether 
a person or company that posts something online is risking suit in 
any country in the world.166 It would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to anticipate and comply with the laws of every country. No 
international treaty or convention has been able to solve this 
compliance problem.167 In the absence of a universally accepted 
international standard, each court conducts its own analysis of 
long-arm jurisdiction to determine whether its forum may resolve 
cases involving international parties. As some defamation 
decisions indicate, even the most minimal contact by a foreign 
party with the forum country can justify jurisdiction.168 
Two standards typically control a determination of jurisdiction 
in defamation cases involving foreign parties: US courts follow an 
established due process standard and focus on the contacts with the 
forum state; many foreign courts, specifically the UK, look to 
where the harm, or injury to one’s reputation, occurred.169 In 
defamation cases, different interpretations as to when and where 
publication occurs further influence courts’ reasoning regarding 
jurisdiction. Considering the current differences in libel law 
standards, the issue of jurisdiction can be determinative of a case’s 
outcome. When a court cannot exert jurisdiction over a foreign 
party, the party will be free from the duties imposed by the laws of 
that country. The question of jurisdiction in the age of the Internet, 
and in light of the unique circumstances that arise with the tort of 
defamation, poses unique issues for courts. Absent a universal 
standard, judges are cognizant of the reasoning of courts all over 
the world in reaching decisions. 
                                                          
164 Bari, supra note 20, at 123. 
165 Dr. Georgios I. Zekos, Personal Jurisdiction After Dow Jones & Co Inc 
v. Gutnik, INTELL. PROP. & IT LAW 10.3(3), June 8, 2005 (UK). 
166 Timofeeva, supra note 20, at 201. 
167 Bari, supra note 20, at 166-67. 
168 See generally Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld [2005] EWHC (Q.B.D.) 1156, Dow 
Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 594. 
169 Bari, supra note 20, at 165. 
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A. Jurisdictional Approaches in the United States 
International Shoe v. Washington170 established the standard 
for determining jurisdiction across state lines in the US, and while 
the borderless nature of the Internet challenges the current notion 
of jurisdiction, the International Shoe standards are still 
substantially applicable.171 Under International Shoe, the 
defendant must have established minimum contacts with the forum 
state, and an assertion of jurisdiction must comport with due 
process, measured by “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”172 This standard of due process is met when 
defendants have purposefully availed themselves of privileges of 
the forum state, such that they could reasonably anticipate being 
subject to suit there.173 The success of International Shoe and its 
                                                          
170 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe was a Delaware corporation 
engaged in the manufacture and sale of shoes. It did not maintain a place of 
business in Washington, but it did employ between 12 and 13 salespeople who 
resided in Washington. They were under direct supervision from the company, 
their principle activities were confined to Washington and they received 
commission based on their sales in Washington. The issue was whether the 
Washington court had jurisdiction over International Shoe for its activities in the 
state. Id. at 311-14.  The Court held that the operations within the state 
established sufficient contact with the state to make the forum reasonable and 
just according to the “traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice” 
to permit the state to enforce the obligations that the defendant has incurred 
there. Id. at 320. 
171 Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can’t Always Use the Zippo Code: The 
Fallacy of a Uniform Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L. 
REV.1147, 1162-63 (2005). 
172 326 U.S. at 316. Here, I am distinguishing in personam jurisdiction, as 
in International Shoe, from traditional notions of general jurisdiction such as 
citizenship in the forum state, incorporation in the forum state, or service of 
process on the individual in the forum state. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
U.S. 457, 462-63 (1940), Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
173 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Here, 
defendants were automobile dealers in the New York area. An automobile that 
the defendants sold was involved in an accident in Oklahoma. The Court said 
that it was reasonable to anticipate that the car might be used in Oklahoma, but 
that alone was not enough to assert jurisdiction over the defendants. They did 
not direct activity outside of the tri-state area, and thus the plaintiff’s unilateral 
activity was too attenuated for the federal court in Oklahoma’s exercise of 
jurisdiction to meet due process requirements. 
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progeny results from its flexibility and ability to evolve with 
changing notions of commerce.174 
The Internet creates a world unconstrained by traditional 
geographical boundaries. As a result, notions of personal 
jurisdiction in this borderless realm are difficult to reconcile with 
the established standards. While the standards of International 
Shoe cannot be seamlessly applied to Internet jurisdiction, a 
leading case confronting Internet jurisdiction, Zippo 
Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com,175 attempts to parallel 
International Shoe.176 The manufacturer of Zippo lighters brought 
suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania under the Lanham Act 
for trademark and dilution claims against a computer news service 
using the domain names zippo.com, zippo.net and zipponews.com. 
The website operator is a California corporation with its principal 
place of business in California. Its contacts with Pennsylvania 
occurred exclusively over the Internet.177 In Zippo, the court 
ultimately found that the Internet contacts with the state if 
Pennsylvania were sufficient to substantiate jurisdiction.178 Zippo 
created a sliding scale along which jurisdiction can be measured 
based upon the level of interactivity between the defendant and the 
forum state.179 This scale ranges from passive sites in which the 
defendant merely posts information on the web to more active sites 
in which the defendant clearly enters into contracts and conducts 
business over the Internet.180 Interactive sites that purposefully 
avail themselves of the jurisdiction’s laws are impliedly subject to 
jurisdiction there as well.181 The sliding scale model lends doubt 
and confusion due to the gray area in the middle of the spectrum, 
but it represents the notion that a defendant must actively seek out 
contact in the forum state to be subject to in personam jurisdiction 
                                                          
174 Yokoyama, supra note 171, at 1163. 
175 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
176 Yokoyama, supra note 171, at 1163. 
177 952 F. Supp. at 1121. 
178 Id at 1127. 
179 Id. at 1124. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
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in that state.182 
Defamation is a non-physical tort without distinct geographical 
parameters, and the process of publication—including 
investigating, writing, printing, and disseminating—may occur in 
several different jurisdictions.183 As a result, defamation cases do 
not easily fold into the standard parameters established in 
International Shoe, and the Supreme Court has considered the 
uniqueness of the tort in its jurisdictional analysis.184 In Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazines, the defendant publisher produced a nationwide 
magazine such that the Court said, “[t]here is no unfairness in 
calling it to answer for the contents of the publication wherever a 
substantial number of copies are regularly sold and distributed.”185 
The circulation in the forum state was sufficient to assert 
jurisdiction, as the defendant purposefully directed content in the 
forum state.186 
The Supreme Court has also held that a plaintiff’s lack of 
contact with the forum state does not necessarily limit imposition 
of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.187 In Calder 
v. Jones, the court built upon World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 
and based its determination of jurisdiction on the effects that 
conduct in Florida could have in California.188 In Calder, the 
                                                          
182 Yokoyama, supra note 171, at 1166. The gray area referred to could be 
an interactive registration service to access sites but which involves no other 
overt commerce. While the defendant may be aware that there is contact with a 
forum state, there is not necessarily control or specific targeting to a forum state 
in those situations. These can be distinguished from revenue-generating 
transactions. 
183 James R. Pielemeier, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The 
Special Case of Multistate Defamation, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 381, 393 (1985). 
184 See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984) (reasoning 
that the petitioner intentionally aimed the actions in California and that the 
injury would be felt in the state in which respondent lives and works). Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, 475 U.S. 770 (1984). 
185 475 U.S. at 781. The respondent published a national magazine and the 
petitioner was a New York resident with limited contacts in the forum state of 
New Hampshire. New Hampshire was the only state that would not have barred 
the action due to the expiration of the statute of limitations since it had not yet 
run in New Hampshire. 
186 Id. at 774-75. 
187 Id. at 779. 
188 465 U.S. at 789. 
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respondent brought a libel action against the writer and editor of an 
allegedly defamatory article that appeared in the National 
Enquirer.189 Jones was a California resident, and both the writer 
and editor were Florida residents with no relevant contacts in 
California.190 The magazine’s largest circulation was in California 
and the respondent lived and worked in California, so the Court 
held that the circumstances were such that petitioners could 
reasonably anticipate being brought to answer suit there.191 This 
“purposeful availment” test is satisfied when the nonresident 
committed an intentional act that was expressly aimed at the forum 
and caused harm to the plaintiff, most of which the defendant knew 
would occur in that forum.192 
The Internet should affect the analysis in defamation cases 
because its borderlessness affects the circumstances upon which 
defamation cases are based. There has been no clear standard to 
emerge involving jurisdiction and the Internet, and more 
specifically, pertaining to personal jurisdiction and the Internet. In 
approaching this issue, the courts have built on pre-existing 
standards applied to traditional print publications.193 For instance, 
in Young v. New Haven Advocate194 it was not sufficient, for 
asserting jurisdiction, that the defendant placed information on the 
Internet that could be read in the forum state.195 Rather, a 
                                                          
189 Id. at 784. 
190 Id. at 785-86. Both the distributor and the national magazine made no 
objection to the jurisdiction of the California court. Id. at 785. 
191 Id. at 790. 
192 Id. at 788-90. 
193 See generally Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002) (refusing to 
recognize jurisdiction in Texas when there were no substantial contacts with 
Texas and the Internet bulletin posting at issue was not targeted to Texas); 
Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
defendant newspapers did not have sufficient Internet contacts with the forum 
state as they did not manifest intent to target Virginia readers). 
194 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002). 
195 Id. at 263. Connecticut sent prisoners to correctional facilities in 
Virginia due to overcrowding in the state’s own prison system. A newspaper in 
Connecticut reported on the controversy that arose from this as well as a class 
action lawsuit that had been filed against the warden. The warden brought this 
action for libel relying on the newspapers Internet based contacts to establish 
jurisdiction. Id. at 258-60. 
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defendant needs to manifest intent to target and focus on readers in 
the forum state.196 By requiring that the publishers intentionally 
target content over the Internet to the forum state, the publisher has 
the ability to limit where they will be brought to suit. Among the 
fifty states, this could help insulate small publishers from suit in 
foreign states due to their online publications. There is uncertainty 
as to whether this would apply in an international context. 
In Keeton, the Court focused on the defendants’ contact with 
the forum state and relied on this contact to substantiate 
jurisdiction.197 Hustler knew that the magazine was published in 
New Hampshire, and by publishing in that state, Hustler assumed a 
risk of being sued there.198 In Calder, the Court seems to adopt a 
different view of contact by relying on the defendant’s knowledge 
of impact in the forum state and the inherent wrongfulness of the 
publication.199 In Young, the court’s approach recognizes the 
problems that the Internet could have for publishers if mere posting 
online was sufficient.200 That court analyzed whether a publisher 
had intentionally targeted the state at issue.201 How the Supreme 
Court will determine defamation law jurisdiction on the Internet 
has yet to be established, and in an international context, the 
problems may be more challenging because of the different weight 
placed on the location of the harm. Only in Calder did the harm 
play a significant impact in the Court’s analysis, and by using the 
reasoning of this case, it would be easy to substantiate jurisdiction 
in an international forum if the defendant knew that the content 
would be directed there and would cause harm in that jurisdiction. 
B. Jurisdictional Analysis in an International Context 
In defamation suits, the benefits and consequences of forum 
shopping among U.S. states may be limited because differences in 
substantive law are restricted by the supremacy of the First 
                                                          
196 Id. 
197 475 U.S. at 778-79. 
198 Id. at 779. 
199 465 U.S. at 788-89. 
200 315 F.3d at 263. 
201 Id. 
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Amendment.202 When defamation occurs on an international scale, 
conflicting international standards on freedom of speech gives rise 
to contrary outcomes. This threat to foreign defendants should 
compel a more forgiving jurisdictional analysis, to prevent 
plaintiffs from regularly shopping for and pursuing actions in the 
forum with the most favorable laws for recovery. But, often the 
jurisdictional analysis reflects the underlying laws and values of 
the home country. For example, in the UK and Australia, 
compensating the harm to the plaintiff’s reputation is the dominant 
concern of the courts; therefore, jurisdiction is justified based on 
where that harm occurs.203 
When the Australian case Dow Jones v. Gutnik204 was decided, 
Internet publishers everywhere trembled at the decision’s potential 
impact on their way of doing business.205 This was the first major 
decision by the highest court of a country ruling on the 
jurisdictional reach of the Internet.206 The plaintiff Gutnik was an 
Australian citizen engaged in business activity both in Australia 
and abroad.207 An article in Barron’s magazine alluded to his 
participation in illegal activities with an individual recently 
convicted of tax evasion, and the article was available online 
                                                          
202 Only cases involving private figures and matters of private concern have 
not been given explicit First Amendment protection. Even in matters involving 
private figures and matters of public concern, the Court has established a 
minimum standard for both fault and falsity. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-47; 
Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 769. The states are free to adopt stricter 
rules than that. Further, in Keeton, the Court only resolved the jurisdictional 
issue and specifically declined to determine which choice of law would apply. 
465 U.S. at 778 n.9. 
203 Dow Jones v. Gutnik (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 606-07. (Austl.); King v. 
Lewis [2004] I.L.Pr. 31 (Q.B.D.) (U.K.). 
204 Though this note primarily focuses on the UK and the US, the impact of 
this Australian decision on the jurisdictional issue deserves to be mentioned. 
Gutnik is an Australian citizen who is the chairman of a publicly traded 
company with activities in both Australia and abroad. The company is engaged 
in philanthropic, political, sporting and religious activity. Dow Jones, 210 
C.L.R. at 594. 
205 Bari, supra note 20, at 123. 
206 Felicity Barringer, Internet Makes Dow Jones Open to Suit in Australia, 
N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, at C6. 
207 Dow Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 594. 
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through the Wall Street Journal website.208 Gutnik sued strictly for 
damage to his reputation in his home state of Victoria, Australia, 
despite his connections to the United States and an interest in his 
reputation there.209 
The publication process could implicate several possible 
forums. The article was written in New York, uploaded onto the 
Internet in New Jersey, and, for the purposes of this decision, read 
in Victoria, Australia.210 Dow Jones argued for a single publication 
rule determining that the upload location was the place of 
publication for consistency and conformity in law, but the court 
decided to evaluate the place where the defamation occurred based 
on the policies underlying the law that made the conduct illegal.211 
The Court ultimately decided that defamation occurs where the 
damage to reputation occurs, so the place of publication is the 
location of the download.212 Since this action was limited to harm 
that occurred in Australia, the Court limited the suit to damages for 
the harm to his reputation only in Victoria.213 
The Court weighed the various policy concerns pertaining to 
the reach of the Internet and the differing laws of the countries 
involved, and they also considered comparable case law in other 
countries when reaching this decision.214 The court found two 
compelling reasons for exercising jurisdiction. First, Australia’s 
interest in compensating the harm to Gutnik’s reputation in their 
territory; and second, the concern about American encroachment 
into Internet litigation since many web servers operate in the 
US.215 Acknowledging that the rationale in the decision could 
create jurisdiction anywhere in the world, the court tried to limit 
the potential reach of the decision and suggested limits to scale 
back the potential for numerous lawsuits throughout the world for 
                                                          
208 Id. Of the 550,000 subscribers to the website, approximately 1,700 
resided in Australia. Only a small amount of the overall print version was also 
sold in Australia. Werley, supra note 14, at 202. 
209 Dow Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 595. 
210 Id. at 606-07. 
211 Id. at 598-601. 
212 Id. at 607. 
213 Id. at 604. 
214 Bari, supra note 20, at 129. 
215 Dow Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 613-14. 
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the same piece of speech.216 Regardless, this decision implies that 
the online publisher of any article containing allegedly defamatory 
material viewed in Australia could be brought to suit in Australia, 
and by extension of this law, anywhere else in the world where the 
alleged defamatory article was read. 
The Dow Jones approach is similar to the approach used in the 
UK. In King v. Lewis, publication was held to be where the 
information was accessed.217 It did not matter whether the 
information was targeted to England, only that it was viewed 
there.218 The British courts have adopted the view that “publication 
is regarded as taking place where the defamatory words are 
published in the sense of being heard or read.”219 The location of 
the harm is the location of the reputational injury. The result is that 
even though the circumstances of the case might indicate both 
minimal contact and minimal reputation damage in the UK (such 
as in King, Polanski and Mahfouz), the court will still assert 
jurisdiction regardless of more appropriate fora. 
In the US, the defendant must perform conduct intentionally 
directed at the proposed jurisdiction to be found liable in that 
jurisdiction.220 When information is posted on a website, the 
plaintiff needs to establish that the information was purposefully 
directed at the forum state.221 The place of publication is not solely 
where the harm occurs. In contrast, in some foreign jurisdictions 
                                                          
216 Id. at 609. For example, if the suit concerned damage to reputation in a 
foreign state, the action would be considered under the laws of that state. Also, 
the court suggested that plaintiffs are unlikely to sue in a given forum unless the 
judgment would be of real value, and they cannot sue unless they have an 
established reputation in that forum. Id. 
217 King v. Lewis [2004] I.L.Pr.31 (Q.B.D.) King is a well-known boxing 
promoter. He was engaged in a public battle with Judd Bernstein over a rematch 
between boxers Mike Tyson and Lennox Lewis. The suit was based on 
statements Mr. Bernstein made in an interview about Mr. King that appeared on 
the boxingtalk.com website. King claimed the statements implied that he is an 
anti-Semite and this damaged his reputation among the boxing community in 
London. Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. See e.g, Berezovsky v. Michaels [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1004. 
220 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
221 Young v. New Haven, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002). See also Revell v. 
Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002). 
MALY MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:36 PM 
916 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
reputation is protected above speech, and thus, jurisdiction is 
determined by the place of injury, which is where the information 
is received. By making the location of the harm determinative of 
jurisdiction, the Court in Dow Jones created uncertainty for online 
publishers concerning which rule of law to use as a guide.222 The 
competing interests of the parties and the law in general seem to be 
balanced as in other defamation cases, but by placing the 
paramount importance on reputation, the courts seem to 
acknowledge but disregard the greater impact this approach could 
have on speech and foreign publishers in general. 
 
III. ENFORCEMENT 
Rachel Ehrenfeld’s case is of particular interest right now 
because she is asking a US court not to enforce the default 
judgment entered against her in England. She argues that 
recognition of the English judgment would violate the US 
Constitution since the two countries operate under conflicting 
defamation laws.223 US case law, as it stands, supports her 
position.224 Courts are not required to give effect to foreign 
judgments that are contrary to public policy.225 Most foreign 
judgments in libel suits have thus far not been enforced in the US, 
as the judgments are considered repugnant to our Constitution.226 
These decisions recognize that attempts to chill speech do not 
comport with the protections afforded by the First Amendment; 
however, this counter-measure is of limited relief to American 
                                                          
222 Werley, supra note 14, at 231. 
223 Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, No. 1:04-CV09641 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 23, 2005). 
224 See, e.g., Bachchan v. India Abroad Pubs., 585 N.Y.S. 2d 661 (1992). 
See also, Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (1997). There is a question as 
to whether this action is ripe for adjudication since Mahfouz has not attempted 
to enforce the action in the United States. This issue will be discussed later in 
the section. 
225 Jeremy Maltby, Note: Juggling Comity and Self-Government: The 
Enforcement of Foreign Libel Judgments in US Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1978, 1983-87 (1994). 
226 See, e.g., Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661. See also Telnikoff, 702 A.2d 
230. 
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publishers. 
A. US Case Law 
Justice Cardozo wrote: “The courts are not free to refuse to 
enforce a foreign right . . . unless help would violate some 
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of 
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common 
weal[th].”227 Court decisions among the several states are enforced 
pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.228 
Typically, state courts will enforce international judgments as a 
matter of policy, though there is no corresponding federal 
requirement.229 This principle of recognition attempts to balance 
the relationship of civil governments to each other as well as the 
rights of the individual parties.230 However, New York, along with 
several other states, has enacted laws allowing for the non-
recognition of foreign money judgments when the cause of action 
on which the judgment is based is repugnant to public policy.231 As 
expected, determining which judgments are repugnant to public 
policy is difficult, and sometimes arbitrary. The result is that this 
ambiguous and vague phrase can take different incarnations 
depending on either substantive or procedural differences among 
foreign states. The New York law, and similar sister state laws, 
apparently reflect a policy that enforcement of the foreign law 
would diminish comparable law in the United States.232 
In libel actions, some courts have held that differences among 
foreign nations in standards of proof and protection of speech are 
                                                          
227 Loucks v. Standard Oil of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918). 
228 U.S. CONST. Art. IV. Sec. 1. 
229 Arthur von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign 
Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 
1602 (1968). 
230 Id. at 1603-04. 
231 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS §117. 
232 See, e.g., Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 250 (1997) 
(reasoning that recognition of the English defamation judgment could lead to a 
wholesale circumvention of fundamental public policy). 
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sufficient to qualify as repugnant.233 In Bachchan v. India Abroad 
Publications,234 a New York court refused to enforce an English 
defamation action in the US, because it was repugnant to the US 
Constitution.235 The story at issue was written by a reporter in 
London working for a New York newspaper and was transmitted 
to papers in India and the US and distributed in the UK.236 The 
court did not consider which jurisdiction would have been 
appropriate or the interests of other foreign states in enforcing the 
judgment, and instead focused on the substantive law in 
question.237 The court here held that the standard of proof in 
English defamation cases violates the US Constitution and results 
in a chilling effect on the media.238 The repugnance lay in the 
domestic effect of recognizing the judgment in the US.239 The case 
suggests that First Amendment rights are so fundamental that laws 
without such a right are per se repugnant.240 
The New York court seemed to approach the case as if the two 
laws were inherently in conflict and struck the law down with only 
a cursory analysis of the actual law and judgment at issue.241 In 
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, the Maryland court reached the same 
conclusion, but the judgment was reached after a thorough analysis 
of the history and application of the two countries’ laws before 
refusing enforcement.242 Telnikoff was an English citizen who 
                                                          
233 Telnikoff,702 A.2d at 250; Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, 585 
N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992). 
234 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992). See also Maltby, supra note 225, at 1983-93. 
235 Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 665. 
236 Id. at 661-62. 
237 It is arguable that freedom of speech was not being exercised based on 
the circumstances of this case. The story was predominantly written and 
published and caused the complaining party damage outside of the United 
States. Based on these circumstances, the court would not necessarily be 
violating the First Amendment in enforcing the judgment because American 
speech concerns are not as significantly involved. Craig A. Stern, Foreign 
Judgments and the Freedom of Speech: Look Who’s Talking, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 
999, 1035 (1994). 
238 Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 664. 
239 Stern, supra note 237, at 1030. 
240 Id. at 1000. 
241 Id. at 999. 
242 Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 239-51. 
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brought the suit in British court for the alleged defamatory 
statements Matusevitch, an American citizen, made in a letter 
published in the Daily Telegraph responding to statements that 
Telnikoff had made in a radio broadcast.243 Telnikoff was 
successful in the UK, and then came to the US to have the 
judgment enforced under principles of comity.244 The court 
observed that the standards governing defamation law in the two 
countries are “totally different . . . in virtually every significant 
respect.”245 These differences were “rooted in historic and 
fundamental public policy differences concerning freedom of the 
press and speech.”246 The court reached its decision 
acknowledging the concern that “recognition of English 
defamation judgments could lead to wholesale circumvention of 
fundamental public policy.”247 
The above cases start with a foreign complainant’s attempt to 
enforce the judgment in the US, and the analysis changes slightly 
when the enforcement by the foreign plaintiff has not yet been 
sought in the US. In such a situation, whether the US court can 
assert jurisdiction becomes a potential bar to an assertion of one’s 
First Amendment rights. This precise issue was recently 
considered in Yahoo! v. La Lingue Contra Le Racisme et 
L’Antisemitisme (LICRA)248 by an en banc Ninth Circuit Court.249 
The American company’s auction site contained Nazi memorabilia 
that could be accessed in France by French citizens in violation of 
French laws prohibiting Nazi memorabilia.250 The French court 
ordered certain measures to be taken to restrict access or remove 
the merchandise from the site and instituted significant fines for 
                                                          
243 Id. at 232-36. The alleged defamatory statements included accusing 
Telnikoff of being a racist, an anti-Semite, and a proponent of racial purity. Id. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 248. 
246 Id.  
247 Id. at 250. 
248 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). Yahoo! was sued in France because its 
US web site, accessible in France, contained Nazi paraphernalia; France has 
laws prohibiting such speech. 
249 Id. at 1202-03. 
250 Id. 
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non-compliance.251 Yahoo! sought declaratory relief in the US, 
claiming that the French order would infringe on the First 
Amendment and as such was unenforceable in the US.252 The 
District Court decided in favor of Yahoo! and granted the 
declaratory relief because enforcement of the French judgment 
against the U.S.-based company would effectively chill speech and 
is contrary to public policy.253 
In Yahoo!, the District Court looked to Bachchan and Telnikoff 
for guidance, and considered the new issue in light of the problems 
created by the extensive reach of the Internet.254 In this case, the 
French ruling has a simultaneous chilling effect in the United 
States because the Internet makes the information widely 
available.255 As such, the First Amendment concerns regarding the 
potential chilling effect on speech outweigh the principal of 
comity.256 The en banc court, however, did not see the issue ripe 
for adjudication.257 There was no indication that the French 
judgment would be enforced against Yahoo! as the company was 
already mostly in compliance and also the French order does not 
impact users in the US.258 The court chose to act prudentially, but 
leaves open the possibility to revisit the First Amendment issue 
should the impact of the order be felt by American users.259 
The outcome of the Yahoo! case could influence a judgment in 
Dr. Ehrenfeld’s pending case. Yahoo! raises the important question 
as to whether the plaintiff in a libel suit is required to seek 
enforcement in US courts before US courts can consider the merits 
                                                          
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 1201. 
253 160 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th 
Cir. 2004), rehearing en banc granted, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2005) 
(NO. 01-17424). 
254 Yahoo!, 160 F. Supp 2d at 1192. 
255 Id. at 1192. 
256 Id. at 1193. 
257 Yahoo!,  433 F.3d at 1201. On the eleven judge panel, eight judges held 
that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Of this eight, five 
judges concluded that the issue was ripe for adjudication and three concluded 
that it was not. Three judges determined that the issue should be dismissed for 
lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. 
258 Id. at 1218-20. 
259 Id. at 1223-24. 
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of their claim, and more specifically the First Amendment 
conflicts. In Yahoo! the court held that the issue was not ripe for 
adjudication, but the factual differences between the two cases do 
not necessarily guarantee the same result. The French order aims to 
restrict content in France but says nothing of comparable content in 
the US or any other territory where the site might reach. 
Ehrenfeld’s case directly implicates freedom of expression because 
it focuses on speech involving a matter of public concern without 
regard to context. There is no indication of an attempt to enforce 
the French order against Yahoo!, unless circumstances change. 
Also, without direct implications in the US, the court in Yahoo! is 
concerned that this would amount to an extraterritorial application 
of the First Amendment.260 One concern expressed regarding Dr. 
Ehrenfeld’s situation is that if Mahfouz never attempts to enforce 
the monetary judgment in the US, she will always be forced to deal 
with the implications of the judgment in the British courts. It 
affects her reputation and credibility as a journalist, and the 
looming monetary judgment could cause financial harm both in 
terms of her credit as well as the imminent possibility of having to 
honor the judgment or fight it legally.261 It is unclear whether 
Mahfouz will seek enforcement of the judgment in the US. This 
tactic could simply be used to dissuade future investigations by 
those skeptical of his political ties.262 His website citing victories 
against journalists and including their court ordered apologies 
could then be his warning statement. 
The enforcement of an English libel judgment could have the 
effect of chilling the speech of US media companies. On a larger 
scale, the Yahoo! decision by the Ninth Circuit could be seen as 
implicitly accepting the foreign judgment in spite of US laws. 
Yahoo! would either have to completely abide by the French order 
or risk incurring substantial fines for non-compliance that may 
                                                          
260 Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1217-18. 
261 Brief for Amazon.com et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, 
Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 04-CV-09641, 2005 WL 696769 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 23, 
2005), available at http://www.public-
integrity.org/publications/publications061105.htm. 
262 Lyall, supra note 1. 
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someday be enforced.263 In essence, it would be subject to the 
speech restrictions of French law despite the legal protections 
afforded to it in the company’s home country.264 But, the court was 
clear that the decision could change should the impact of the 
speech restrictions be felt on American soil.265 The Bachchan and 
Telnikoff cases and the District Court’s ruling in Yahoo! v. LICRA 
suggest that enforcement would chill speech in the US.266 Either 
enforcement of a judgment or denial of a declaratory judgment 
would suggest that there are limits to the First Amendment’s 
guarantee. On the other hand, principles of comity are widely 
recognized and accepted among foreign nations, and enforcement 
of a foreign judgment might not have such a troublesome impact 
by suggesting that the First Amendment offers less protection than 
previously thought.267 
An author or publisher facing a libel lawsuit in a foreign court 
cannot necessarily rely on the US courts to disregard the judgment 
as their sole means of protection. With the globalization of the 
media, many publishing companies have global offices and assets. 
In those cases, the defamed party does not necessarily need the 
assistance of US courts to enforce the judgment. The judgment can 
be enforced against the assets in the foreign state, even if the 
defendant also has assets in the US.268 Any magazine or newspaper 
that has a foreign news office in London or transacts other business 
in the United Kingdom will be subject to suit there regardless of 
                                                          
263 Yahoo! v. LICRA, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The 
order assed fines of approximately $13,000 per day for non-compliance after a 
three-month allowance period. Id. 
264 Id. at 1192-93. 
265 This enforces the proposition that Americans should abide by foreign 
laws when operating in a foreign country. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Defamation 
in the Digital Age: Some Comparative Law Observations on the Difficulty of 
Reconciling Free Speech and Reputation in the Emerging Global Village, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 351 (2005).This could have interesting implications 
if applied to defamation law. 
266 See Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 234-35; Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 250-01; 
Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192-93. 
267 Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be 
Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 862 (2004). 
268 Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens 
Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 349 (1964). 
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whether the principle nature of their work is reporting for a US-
based publication or whether their work is actually published in the 
UK. Ehrenfeld’s situation is unique in today’s world since, as an 
individual author, she does not have assets in the UK like many 
international publishing companies; her situation now seems more 
the exception than the rule.269 
IV. THE CONFLICT 
Both the US and the UK recognize the value of a free and open 
discussion of public affairs.270 The countries, however, place 
different weight on what speech is protected, and as a result, create 
serious implications for the value of free speech. This impacts the 
conduct of American journalists in the global media market. The 
possibility of being subject to libel suits in countries not offering 
the same protections as the First Amendment can force journalists 
to think twice about potential consequences before publishing their 
work.271 The limitations imposed by foreign courts could 
encourage responsible journalism, but professional standards and 
the market for news arguably encourage this responsibility 
already.272 However, these limitations could also cause a chilling 
effect on the media and stymie their willingness to publish 
controversial, yet important, information by taking away First 
Amendment protections.273 
                                                          
269 Rachel Ehrenfeld is currently unable to travel in the UK because of the 
judgment pending against her, which potentially hinders professional 
opportunities. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Banned in The U.K., FrontPageMage.com, Oct. 
26, 2005, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp ?ID=19950. 
270 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964); 
Reynolds v. Times Newspaper, [2001] 2.A.C. 127, 200 (U.K.). 
271 To an extent, this has already happened. In an ABA-sponsored survey 
on Global Internet Jurisdiction, more than half of the media company 
respondents indicated that they have adjusted their business operations in 
response to the risk posed by Internet jurisdiction and its implications. Michael 
Geist, Global Internet Jurisdiction: The ABA/ ICC Survey (Apr. 2004), available 
at www.abanet.org/buslaw/newsletter/ 0023/materials/js.pdf. 
272 Keith Schilling, The Americanization of English Libel Laws, ENT. L. 
REV. 2000, 11(3), 48-49. 
273 See generally Kohler, supra note 10, at 1206-13 (discussing possible 
stories that would not have come to light with a less restrictive defamation 
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It is difficult to resolve a conflict between two nations that is 
based on inherent differences between each nation’s priorities. 
Both countries promote free expression and consider it a means to 
a democratic government, and so the roots of the concept of 
freedom of expression are similar.274 The differences in 
application, though, are substantial, and in the global media 
market, create considerable discrepancy as to which libel law 
governs various publications.275 In application, one law trumps the 
other.276 Principles of comity in respecting foreign law and foreign 
judgments seem to be disregarded because of the importance 
placed on regulating speech and the interests to be protected.277 
American defendants will undoubtedly continue to be sued in 
foreign jurisdictions without First Amendment protections, and 
there are currently no clear recourses available to American 
defendants, publishers, courts or policy makers faced with this 
problem. Even more problematic for those involved with American 
media, is that the domestic solutions that do exist seem 
insufficient. Americans would reject the first hint of a solution that 
would diminish the protections of the First Amendment in the 
                                                          
standard than New York Times); Weaver, supra note 122, at 1287-88 and 1311-
12 (discussing the possibility of a hypothetical Watergate situation under British 
law). 
274 See discussion supra Part I. 
275 For example, in Polanski, discussed supra Part I.B.2, Vanity Fair could 
have been subject to suit in the US where it publishes, in the UK where it had a 
small circulation, or in France where Polanski lives and the magazine also has a 
small circulation. What if he had been filming a movie in the Czech Republic 
when the article was released? This further raises the question of whether he 
could have sued in the Czech Republic for the damage done to his reputation 
there. 
276 For example, when looking at the relevant cases in both the U.K. and 
the U.S., each country decides to adopt their own laws and specifically refuses 
to enforce the other. In Reynolds, the Court did consider the American law in 
reaching their decision. 2 A.C. at 198-201. Further, in Polanski, the British court 
was willing to apply U.K. laws over an American publisher for a predominantly 
American publication. Dow Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 612-13. In the US, by refusing 
to enforce foreign libel judgments in both Bachchan and Telkinoff, the American 
courts recognize supremacy of American law over the British courts’ decisions. 
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 250 (1997); Bachchan v. India Abroad 
Publications, 585 N.Y.S.2d  661 (1992). 
277 Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 250; Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661. 
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US.278 Many foreign states, fearful of any implication of the 
supremacy of US law, have expressed disdain for a policy adopting 
the standards for free speech as established by the US Constitution 
and courts.279 This entrenched conflict in substantive law and 
fundamental public policies means that any potential solution for 
the media will be not easily be found in terms of jurisdiction and 
enforcement. 
Potential solutions have been proposed, though they are neither 
easy nor satisfactory. One potential solution involves setting a 
universal jurisdiction for cases involving the Internet as the means 
of distribution, or more clearly defining jurisdictional rules for 
international defamation.280 A second solution focuses on an 
international agreement establishing a universal protocol in 
defamation cases involving foreign parties.281 Finally, the third, 
and most feasible option, argues that the solution exists partially 
within the status quo. By expanding the current law of conflicting 
countries, the solution could be remedied more satisfactorily than 
by attempting to define international defamation standards.282 
A. An Internet-Based Solution 
One solution suggests that Internet jurisdiction should be based 
on contact with the forum state without regard to the substantive 
law of the defendant’s home state. This satisfies the reputation-
protective nature underlying many nations’ defamation laws by 
allowing the allegedly defamed to vindicate his or her reputation in 
the home country where the injury is most likely felt. A major 
concern regarding this effects-based approach, as adopted by both 
                                                          
278 Ken Kraus, Enforcement of Foreign Media Judgments in the Aftermath 
of Gutnik v. Dow Jones & Co., 21 SPG COMM. LAW. 1, 25-27 (2003). 
279 See generally Dow Jones v. Gutnik (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 606-07. 
(Austl.); Reynolds v. Times Newspaper, [2001] 2.A.C. 127, 200 (U.K.). See also 
Jonathan Harris, Forum Shopping in International Libel, L.Q.R. 2000, 116 
(OCT), 562, 568. 
280 See supra Part IV.A. 
281 This is not a new solution, and an international agreement certainly has 
been attempted, especially for jurisdictional concerns. See, e.g., Kraus, supra 
note 278. 
282 See supra Part IV.C. 
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Australia and the UK, is the chilling effect on publishers being 
afraid of foreign suit from using the Internet to disseminate 
information.283 In this worse case scenario, publishers could simply 
choose to not post articles and information online as a means to 
avoid the risk.284 Imposition of suit based on effect-based 
jurisdiction could cause more impact on multi-national media 
companies while having little effect on independent publishers.285 
At first glance, this does not seem problematic, but the media 
entities regulated by the market and public opinion might choose 
silence instead of risk, while individual and potentially 
irresponsible bloggers could fill the void left open.286 If a publisher 
assumes that by putting information on the web, they are assuming 
the risk of suit in various foreign entities, they may simply choose 
not to assume the risk if the threat and costs of suits increase.287 
It is unreasonable to require publishers to exercise control over 
who visits their sites. The technology surrounding the Internet is 
constantly evolving, and there has been some suggestion that it is 
possible to attach significance to the geographical location of those 
active on the Internet.288 Websites and Internet Service Providers 
                                                          
283 Bari, supra note 20, at 164-68. 
284 Id. 
285 Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 
1217 (1998). For example, bloggers with no foreign assets could defame at will 
because suit in a foreign jurisdiction would mean little since the judgment could 
not be enforced locally. Large media entities could refrain or restrict publishing 
since this effect-based approach poses more of a risk to their continued viability. 
286 This is certainly a worse case scenario and too extreme to likely ever 
happen. But regardless, this effects-based approach highlights the inconsistent 
treatment of various publishers. In international defamation actions, the standard 
fails to punish defamatory speech and instead, real success is often 
determinative on whether the speaker has assets in a particular location. While 
that summation simplifies the problem, if vindicating injury to reputation is the 
goal, this seems to miss the mark unless the actual judgment is all the alleged 
defamed individual hopes to achieve. 
287 This will be looked at through a cost-benefit analysis later in this 
section. 
288 Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-Location Technologies and Other 
Means of Placing Borders on the ‘Borderless’ Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 101, 101 (2004). According to the estimates of two expert 
witnesses in the Yahoo! case, it is possible to achieve a filtering success rate of 
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(ISPs) do filter content based on user location.289 It is not 
uncommon for larger sites to require users who visit and read 
content on the site to register.290 Publishers could attempt to block 
access to every country with objectionable laws, but this is not an 
easy undertaking.291 This is an unsatisfactory alternative because 
many online publishers might not have the means to accomplish 
this ‘blackout’,292 due to the high costs of such measures.293 This 
                                                          
90% through geographical identification of IP addresses and a declaration of 
nationality 
289 Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1951, 1962 (2005). According to the estimates of two expert witnesses in 
the Yahoo! case, it is possible to achieve a filtering success rate of 90% through 
geographical identification of IP addresses and a declaration of nationality. A 
third expert doubts this number due to its reliance on users to respond truthfully 
under the honor system. Yahoo! v. LICRA, 433 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006). 
290 See, e.g. Dow Jones, 2 C.L.R. at 129. 
291 A publisher would literally have to block access to the entire country 
with unfavorable laws. There could be no click-through contract or the like since 
a third party’s actions can substantiate suit. The contract would not be able to be 
one enforceable between the actual parties. Also, corporations would have to 
hire lawyers familiar with each country’s laws or make a publishing judgment 
based on the least offensive material to satisfy the most stringent country’s laws. 
Content filtering may help to avoid liability internationally, but it could also 
result in a global chilling effect on both speech and online commerce. Jay 
Wahlquist, The World Summit on the Information Society: Making the Case for 
Private Industry Filtering to Control Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and 
Transnational Internet Censorship Conflicts, 1 INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 283, 289 
(2005). 
292 This was one of the problems cited in Yahoo!. Yahoo! claimed it did not 
have the means to restrict access of the content from France, thus resulting in a 
chill on its speech. Yahoo! v. LICRA, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1184-85 (N.D. Cal. 
2001). However, Google is currently blocking certain search results on the 
Google.cn website in cooperation with the Chinese government. Joseph Kahn, 
So Long Dalai Lama: Google Adapts to China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at § 
4. Google does disclose when searches are being censored. Id. Due to the size of 
the Chinese market, it might be more damaging to completely pull out of the 
market. David Barboza, Version of Google in China Won’t Offer E-Mail or 
Blogs, N.Y, TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at § C3. This does suggest that the technology 
is possible, but it does not necessarily mean that it is financially worthwhile in 
many situations. In both the Yahoo! case and a similar case involving 
CompuServe in Germany, the Internet Service Provider chose to block the 
offensive content rather than spend resources utilizing nation specific targeting. 
Wahlquist, supra note 291 at 289-90. 
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could also disproportionately affect ISPs, as they become a target 
for such actions even if individual users place the offensive content 
online.294 Further, evasive measures exist for those who do not 
want to be linked to, and thus limited by, their geographic location, 
and this would stymie efforts at jurisdiction control. 
Suppose the international community adopts an approach 
similar to the one adopted by the US in Young v. New Haven 
Advocate295 and requires that the publisher purposefully targets the 
forum state to be subject to jurisdiction there. A website operator 
who knows the location of a visitor to his or her site can limit the 
contacts with certain jurisdictions based on that information.296 
Through advertising and content, a publisher can target certain 
countries and avoid others. This would improve the ability to 
anticipate applicable laws and avoid jurisdictions with unfavorable 
laws. This is also not as tenuous a link to jurisdiction as mere 
accessibility of a website in a forum. 
Either of the above suggestions limiting Internet jurisdiction 
ultimately limit the ability of a party to bring suit for defamation. 
An individual named in a potentially defamatory article might not 
have the means to view or read such article and respond to the 
allegations. In the alternative, an individual may be able to read 
and access the information but not pursue the action in their home 
jurisdiction because the site did not specifically target that country. 
                                                          
293 A blogger interested in world politics who regularly airs complaints 
about foreign leaders should not be provided less protection against foreign 
defamation actions than the large media conglomerate who can afford to impose 
the viewing restriction, especially since it might not be necessary to have this 
blocking protection due to the number of people who view the site. Arguably, 
this solution might achieve a market balance in a way. Independent American 
bloggers and the like will unlikely have foreign assets, and so the judgment will 
not be enforced in the US. This underestimates the legal expenses in defending 
suit here and the effect of having a defamation judgment on record in a foreign 
country. The media entities with the means to limit viewing also likely have 
assets in those countries, and so the restriction option works for them in the way 
that the enforcement option, as used in Bachchan, will not. 
294 Wahlquist, supra note 291, at 292. There is a greater incentive to go 
after ISPs than individual users as the effects of actions to restrict content will 
have greater reach than merely targeting individual users. Id. 
295 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002). 
296 Svantesson, supra note 288, at 103-04. 
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Reputation-protective countries might take issue with the 
restrictions, and to an extent they already have.297 The restrictions 
limit an individual’s ability to vindicate their reputation, which is 
counter to the intent and goals of some individual defamation 
laws.298 
The Internet solution is not limited to issues focused on access 
of information. While apparently rational, the place of uploading 
information to the web neither should nor could become the 
controlling forum. Defendants would not have to anticipate suit in 
foreign states because they could choose the applicable laws by 
choosing where to publish or, as pertains to the Internet, upload.299 
This solution is appealing to American media because it allows 
them to continue to operate solely under the protections of US law, 
and could give the broadest reach and force of the First 
Amendment. This solution then puts the US in the position to 
become a host location to many media companies, by offering 
more media protective laws.300 But, this solution, while arguably 
the most media protective, is also highly unrealistic. It imposes US 
defamation law on foreign nations when the defamatory statement 
at issue is published electronically despite the fact the US approach 
to freedom of expression represents a minority approach.301 It 
could potentially cause a race to the bottom that would heighten 
the resolve of foreign courts to assert jurisdiction in their own 
systems.302 Courts have already refused to recognize this definition 
of publication and are unlikely to start to do so at the expense of 
their own laws for the purposes of certainty in the international 
                                                          
297 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
298 See discussion supra Part I. 
299 Dow Jones v. Gutnik (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 632-33 (Austl.). 
300 Id. 
301 Krotoszynski, supra note 265, at 350. 
302 Both Reynolds and Dow Jones considered US law in reaching their 
decision and specifically refused to adopt it as counter to the reputational 
interests protected in both the UK and Australia. Reynolds v. Times Newspaper, 
[2001] 2.A.C. 127, 198-201 (U.K.); Dow Jones, 210 C.L.R. at 612-13. There is 
also the risk that the U.S. could become a safe haven for unpopular speech, such 
as hate speech. Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1958 (2005). 
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arena.303 
This solution further poses a considerable imposition to 
plaintiffs wanting to bring suit, and a plaintiff’s inconvenience 
should factor into a courts’ decision when considering whether to 
assert jurisdiction. This could be rectified by allowing plaintiffs to 
pursue a suit in their home state while using the substantive law of 
the defendant’s state.304 However, it is unlikely that one country’s 
court will accept another’s country’s law as superior to their own 
when different interests are valued.305 The plaintiff would not 
suffer the inconvenience of bringing suit in a foreign state, but the 
application of the differing laws of the foreign state might be as 
great an imposition to suit. 
B. An International Agreement 
The potential of a jurisdiction-based solution, while appealing, 
may not resolve the issue, especially since there is currently no 
uniform rule to determine jurisdiction. A uniform, global set of 
standards for information published on the Internet presents an 
alternate, though likely impossible, solution to this problem.306 
This model has been applied in other contexts. For example, the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
maintains the uniformity of domain names and other unique 
identifiers.307 The Berne Convention oversees international 
copyright protection,308 and the Hague Convention is attempting to 
resolve uncertainty in online contracts through Internet jurisdiction 
                                                          
303 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
304 The court in Dow Jones did suggest that if the action was for defamation 
in more than one state, due consideration might be given to the laws of that state 
when reaching the jurisdiction. Since this case was limited to damage caused in 
Victoria, there was no need to fully analyze this option. 210 C.L.R. at 609. 
305 Werley supra note 14, at 222-23. 
306 Bari, supra note 20, at 167. See also, Marc H. Greenberg A Return to 
Lilliput: The LICRA v. Yahoo! Case and the Regulation of Online Content in 
the World Market, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1191, 1250 (2003). 
307 See www.icann.org. 
308 18 Am. Jur. 2d Copyright and Literary Property § 202. 
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through an international treaty.309 In defamation contexts, the 
possibility that such an agreement will be adopted on an 
international scale is unlikely.310 It is doubtful that a country will 
forfeit its own laws or limit the effect of such laws to an 
international standard based on different ideals.311 In defamation 
actions, the contested issue involves each country’s values, and it 
would likely be harder to reach a consistent arrangement when 
values are at issue.312 In the US, any agreement that diminishes 
First Amendment protection would likely suffer constitutional 
challenges at home.313 
However, an international agreement need not sweep so 
broadly. If it is unrealistic to assume that countries would reach an 
agreement on defamation law in general due to differing values as 
to what speech should be protected, there is no reason that the 
agreement could not be limited in its scope. For example, an 
agreement could limit jurisdiction to the plaintiff’s home venue or 
the publisher’s home venue. This could limit libel tourism but it 
still does not adequately protect reputational interests, as it might 
exclude a person’s place of business or any other basis for 
jurisdiction in a location where a person’s reputation may have 
been injured. The agreement could also focus on damages, such as 
limiting recovery of damages to actual injury suffered in that 
jurisdiction, or limiting the number of locations in which a party 
could pursue a defamation action for a particular publication. 
These limitations could rein in forum shopping, but it leaves the 
question as to whether parties would agree to this more willingly 
                                                          
309 Members of the Hague convention have attempted this with 
enforcement. Krause, supra note 278, at 25-26. Part of the problem in reaching 
an agreement in the Hague Convention is that it would require the US to enforce 
foreign judgments. It could mean that a business would be vulnerable to suit 
anywhere in the world. Denis T. Rice, Problems in Running a Global Internet 
Business: Complying with the Laws of Other Countries, 797 PLI/PAT 11, 36 
(2004). 
310 Bari, supra note 20, at 167. See also Greenberg, supra note 306, at 
1250. 
311 Id. 
312 Timofeeva, supra note 20, at 223. “Given the divergent policies and 
values embraced by governments throughout the world, arriving at an 
international agreement seems nearly impossible at this time.” Id. 
313 Bari, supra note 20, at 167. 
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than another international jurisdiction or defamation-based 
agreement. In the alternative, the proposed international agreement 
could focus on the choice of law and be reached as a compromise 
over two conflicting sets of laws among nations.314 
C. A Solution Within the Current Law 
One impetus of the decision in New York Times was free 
exchange of ideas and information, and as such, the Court 
determined that speech should be over-protected rather than under-
protected.315 The Court feared that requiring a showing of truth to 
prevent unreasonably high libel judgments would result in self-
censorship.316 This self-censorship, as compelled by the state 
through libel laws, limits public debate.317 With limited legal 
protection for speech, publishers would err on the side of caution 
by choosing not to publish, rather than risk the threat of suit.318 
When the Court extended the New York Times “actual malice” 
standard beyond matters involving public officials, it implicitly 
recognized the value of free speech in those other contexts.319 
British journalists recognize the chilling effect that their 
                                                          
314 Krotoszynski, supra note 265, at 351. For example, if the Europeans do 
not like the US antitrust laws, they could agree to recognize a safe harbor for 
defamation actions pursued in their nations while the US agrees to recognize a 
safe harbor for certain antitrust violations. Id. 
315 Harry Kalvern, Jr. The New York Times Case: A Note on “the Central 
Meaning on the First Amendment” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 213 (1964) 
(discussing the effects of the Supreme Court decision and its potential impact on 
the tort of defamation). 
316 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all 
his factual assertions- and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually 
unlimited in amount leads to a comparable self-censorship . . . .The rule 
thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is 




319 See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
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country’s laws have on their work.320 Publication decisions are 
made not just by the author and editors, but also attorneys, based 
on the availability of proof and the potential for a lawsuit.321 
British journalists even suggest that a journalism-spurred 
investigation like Watergate would not have been able to happen in 
the UK due to the reluctance of publishers to publish legally 
inadmissible evidence.322 The British courts are cognizant of the 
potential chilling effect on the media and allow exceptions.323 In 
Reynolds, the freedom to disseminate political information was 
said to be essential to the proper functioning of the established 
democracy, but the Court stopped short of extending media 
protection in the vein of the New York Times standard since the 
protection of reputation is “conducive to the public good.”324 If no 
privilege is found to exist on balance with protecting one’s 
reputation, then the only means for relief is proving the truth of the 
statements.325 This can be difficult.326 Imposing this reputation-
protective standard on American publishers circumvents US laws 
and could chill US speech if Americans are increasingly forced to 
defend defamation cases under British laws. The decisions in the 
Polanski and Ehrenfeld cases in the UK suggest the ease with 
which the First Amendment can be disregarded simply by 
changing jurisdictions.327 
This concern over a chilling effect is validated by the fact that 
Dr. Ehrenfeld’s British publisher cancelled publication of her book 
on the mere threat of a lawsuit.328 Another journalist, Craig Unger, 
faced a similar fate in England over his book on the relationship 
between the Saudi Royal Family and the Bush family.329 The 
                                                          
320 See generally Weaver, supra note 109 (reporting interviews with 
journalists on Reynolds and its implications in their profession). 
321 Id. 
322 Weaver, supra note 122, at 1287-88, 1311-12. 
323 Reynolds v. Times Newspaper, [2001] 2.A.C. 127, 192 (U.K.). 
324 Id. at 200-01. 
325 See supra Part I.B.1. 
326 See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
327 Supra Parts I.B.2. and III.C. 
328 Lyall, supra note 1. 
329 Id. Unger’s book, House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret 
Relationship Between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties, became a 
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British publisher of Unger’s book claimed that the lawsuit was 
inevitable, and though Unger’s book was good, it was not worth 
the trouble of a long and expensive suit.330 The mere threat of suit 
limits the reach of the author’s publication in print form and 
prevents the information from being received in the UK. If the 
trend continues or worsens, publishers could take more affirmative 
steps to limit the reach of the information to these jurisdictions, by 
either limiting online sales or online postings. In such a case, 
speech is no longer chilled, but rather frozen, because the speech is 
effectively cut off from a segment of the population, such as the 
entire UK audience or even the American audience, based on the 
extent of the preventative measures enacted to limit the threat of 
suit. 
The chilling effect of international libel suits is not limited to 
the publication of information, but could also extend further to the 
investigative process.331 The effect of these judgments could 
discourage other scholars from investigating terrorism funding or 
mentioning such individuals as Mr. Mahfouz by name.332 In her 
complaint filed in the Southern District of New York, Dr. 
Ehrenfeld claimed, “If this action is dismissed, writers will be 
afraid to do their jobs properly and aggressively, and the search for 
the truth behind issues of the highest and most urgent public 
interest will be compromised.”333 In the Amici Curiae brief 
submitted on behalf of Dr. Ehrenfeld to the New York court, 
several members of the media and international communities 
jointly contended that should the British judgment be allowed to 
                                                          
bestseller in the U.S. and was published in Germany, Spain and Brazil, among 
other places. One publishing company even considered going as far as setting up 
a separate legal entity solely to publish this book in the UK. Like several other 
publishing companies, however, they feared the almost inevitable libel suit. Id. 
It is unlikely that the Reynolds qualified privilege would extend to Unger, and so 
his only likely defense would have been to prove the truth of the allegations. See 
supra note 141. 
330 Id. 
331 Brief for Amazon.com, supra note 261. 
332 Id. 
333 Mike Dodd, Ehrenfeld: International Libel Law Battle ‘IS ABOUT 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH,’ PA NEWS, June 16, 2005 (quoting the Memorandum 
of Law submitted to the New York Supreme Court on behalf of Ehrenfeld). 
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stand, the impact would be felt by numerous authors and 
publishers alike by giving effect and credibility to the tactics of 
“libel tourists” such as Mahfouz.334 The media is a part of the 
intelligence process, and they can only fulfill their role as 
investigators with the support of the government and the law.335 
Despite the potential chilling effect threatened by international 
libel suits, the law as it stands does provide potential remedial 
measures that are currently more realistic and workable than 
creating universal Internet jurisdiction or an international 
agreement. The constantly evolving technology and the substantive 
differences underlying the law of international defamation make 
the previous two options currently insufficient to address the 
problem. Expansive definitions of the current law and current 
remedial measures offer sufficient protection in this evolving 
controversy. 
Expanding the definition of qualified privilege may reconcile 
the different laws. The laws recognize the same fundamental idea, 
the importance of freedom of expression, though they accord value 
to open discussion and reputation differently.336 While it may be 
impossible to completely rectify them now, British law is moving 
in the direction of expanding qualified privilege.337 By working 
within the established guidelines of the qualified privilege 
exception, there could be a more balanced solution to the current 
conflict of libel laws and thus a more balanced protection for 
journalists. In Reynolds, the court suggests a circumstantial test for 
evaluating the qualified privilege.338 This test specifically leaves 
room for interpretation.339 It is even arguably similar to the actual 
malice standard in New York Times.340 In his opinion, Lord 
Nicholls said that the law was supposed to be protective of the 
press,341 so it should ideally live up to that requirement. However, 
the decision also considered the importance of valuing reputation 
                                                          
334 Brief for Amazon.com et al, supra note 261. 
335 ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22, at xviii. 
336 See discussion supra Part I.A.1 and Part I.B.2. 
337 Weaver, supra note 122, at 1315-16. 
338 See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
339 Reynolds v. Times Newspaper, [2001] 2.A.C. 127, 204 (U.K.). 
340 ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22, at 133. 
341 Reynolds, 2 A.C. at 205. 
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in a democratic society, suggesting that it is a necessary element of 
the public good.342 
By adhering to the reputation-protective common law, the UK 
courts could unnecessarily chill speech and harm the public 
discourse without fully achieving the common law’s aim. No one 
knows how the law of Reynolds will be interpreted or how far the 
qualified privilege will be extended.343 A subsequent case suggests 
that it will not be as protective as originally hoped.344 The 
circumstances listed in Reynolds do propose a broad reading and 
application of qualified privilege, but until these circumstances are 
actually tested in court, there is no way to know for sure. Part of 
the problem may not be the judiciary but rather the press lawyers 
who err on the side of caution, and urge against publication if there 
is the slight possibility of legal action.345 The law may be more 
restrictive in its letter than its spirit, and members of the media 
have failed to use the courts to protect their freedoms.346 The press 
could also invoke the free expression principle in Article 10 of the 
ECHR to challenge restrictions on their freedom.347 By reading 
into the circumstances literally on such criteria as the urgency of 
the publication, the privilege might not be met and the defendant 
would be forced to prove the truth of the allegation. This also 
could cause considerable disadvantage to book publishers who 
likely do not have as strong an argument to make concerning the 
urgency of the publication.348 When it concerns a matter of public 
                                                          
342 Id. at 201. Lord Nicholls does not seem to have much faith in the press 
or their decision-making ability in terms of adequately protecting the reputation 
of individuals. This seems to form a basis for the restrictions in the judgment. Id. 
at 202. 
343 Weaver, supra note 122, at 1315. 
344 Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe [2004] E.M.L.R.11; Cram, supra 
note 129. While the court recognized that terrorism was a public concern, this 
did not outweigh the reputation interests of the individual linked for 
participation in terrorism funding absent some urgency in disseminating the 
information. 
345 ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 22, at xiii. 
346 Id. at xiv. The excessive costs of libel suits and the risk that the losing 
party might potentially incur the litigation costs of both parties is further 
hindrance to pursuing or defending a claim. Id. at 76-79. 
347 Id. 
348 Evans, supra note 149, at 33. 
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interest, the reasonableness of the investigative process and the 
subject matter should outweigh the injury to reputation. 
If any of the above public international law solutions are 
unworkable, large media companies may be able to minimize the 
risks of the status quo. There are inherent conflicts in the 
substantive laws of the various countries that make a satisfactory 
international agreement untenable. But the media is a big business, 
and the current global model allows publishers to broaden their 
reach, and thus their audience considerably. If Barrons Online has 
an audience in Australia and a few assets there, it might be worth 
risking an occasional libel suit to reap the everyday profits 
associated with running a global business,349 especially if the 
damages are limited to the actual publication in that jurisdiction.350 
In many situations, the costs of either instituting effective 
prohibitive measures to prevent publication in certain areas or the 
cost of defamation suits might not be so significant as to outweigh 
the benefits of foreign publication. International corporations 
assume the risk of liability in brick and mortar transactions in 
foreign jurisdictions, and so there is no reason to assume that this 
assumption of risk will not factor into their determination to invest 
in foreign media markets.351 There is the further benefit to 
American publishers of not having the First Amendment 
protections watered down through an international agreement. But, 
the benefits may not always outweigh the costs, and the problem of 
international libel litigation might rise to the point of forcing action 
or silencing global speech. 
 
                                                          
349 The Supreme Court of Victoria’s opinion suggests that the policy 
arguments against the court asserting jurisdiction over Dow Jones are driven by 
the belief of the superiority of US law and not grounded in business interest. 
Joseph Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Company, (2001) VSC 305, ¶61 (Austl.). This 
suggests a belief that the consequences of the decision will not derail the 
business objectives of the company or cause them to limit publication. 
350 This is one area of international defamation law that might benefit from 
an international agreement. If damages are limited to injury incurred in the 
jurisdiction in which the action is being pursued, media companies risk the 
punitive penalties that plaintiff-friendly libel countries could confer. 
351 Wahlquist, supra note 291. 
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CONCLUSION 
The conflicts surrounding US law and foreign libel laws 
concern a number of different issues and could have an enormous 
impact on the practices of the media in the emerging global 
market. Since part of the conflict arises from differences in 
underlying substantive law values, the issue in an international 
context cannot be easily dealt with through long-arm jurisdiction 
or principles of comity. It is impossible to say that one law is 
superior to another, and unrealistic to assume that one should 
control the other in practice. Freedom of expression is protected in 
both the UK and the US, and maybe this should be the starting 
point towards more harmonization in the law. Instead of trying to 
change the law directly, those brought to suit could try to change it 
slowly within the confines of the developing qualified privilege 
doctrine. Defendants like Conde Nast might not be protected, but 
authors like Deborah Irving and Rachel Ehrenfeld might have 
more of a chance at success. 
 
 
